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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h')
-rw-r--r--tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h75
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h b/tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c742b0881
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __SUBCMD_UTIL_H
+#define __SUBCMD_UTIL_H
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+static inline void report(const char *prefix, const char *err, va_list params)
+{
+ char msg[1024];
+ vsnprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), err, params);
+ fprintf(stderr, " %s%s\n", prefix, msg);
+}
+
+static __noreturn inline void die(const char *err, ...)
+{
+ va_list params;
+
+ va_start(params, err);
+ report(" Fatal: ", err, params);
+ va_end(params);
+ exit(128);
+}
+
+#define zfree(ptr) ({ free(*ptr); *ptr = NULL; })
+
+#define alloc_nr(x) (((x)+16)*3/2)
+
+/*
+ * Realloc the buffer pointed at by variable 'x' so that it can hold
+ * at least 'nr' entries; the number of entries currently allocated
+ * is 'alloc', using the standard growing factor alloc_nr() macro.
+ *
+ * DO NOT USE any expression with side-effect for 'x' or 'alloc'.
+ */
+#define ALLOC_GROW(x, nr, alloc) \
+ do { \
+ if ((nr) > alloc) { \
+ if (alloc_nr(alloc) < (nr)) \
+ alloc = (nr); \
+ else \
+ alloc = alloc_nr(alloc); \
+ x = xrealloc((x), alloc * sizeof(*(x))); \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+
+static inline void *xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
+{
+ void *ret = realloc(ptr, size);
+ if (!ret)
+ die("Out of memory, realloc failed");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define astrcatf(out, fmt, ...) \
+({ \
+ char *tmp = *(out); \
+ if (asprintf((out), "%s" fmt, tmp ?: "", ## __VA_ARGS__) == -1) \
+ die("asprintf failed"); \
+ free(tmp); \
+})
+
+static inline void astrcat(char **out, const char *add)
+{
+ char *tmp = *out;
+
+ if (asprintf(out, "%s%s", tmp ?: "", add) == -1)
+ die("asprintf failed");
+
+ free(tmp);
+}
+
+#endif /* __SUBCMD_UTIL_H */