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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h b/tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c742b0881 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/lib/subcmd/subcmd-util.h @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __SUBCMD_UTIL_H +#define __SUBCMD_UTIL_H + +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <linux/compiler.h> + +static inline void report(const char *prefix, const char *err, va_list params) +{ + char msg[1024]; + vsnprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), err, params); + fprintf(stderr, " %s%s\n", prefix, msg); +} + +static __noreturn inline void die(const char *err, ...) +{ + va_list params; + + va_start(params, err); + report(" Fatal: ", err, params); + va_end(params); + exit(128); +} + +#define zfree(ptr) ({ free(*ptr); *ptr = NULL; }) + +#define alloc_nr(x) (((x)+16)*3/2) + +/* + * Realloc the buffer pointed at by variable 'x' so that it can hold + * at least 'nr' entries; the number of entries currently allocated + * is 'alloc', using the standard growing factor alloc_nr() macro. + * + * DO NOT USE any expression with side-effect for 'x' or 'alloc'. + */ +#define ALLOC_GROW(x, nr, alloc) \ + do { \ + if ((nr) > alloc) { \ + if (alloc_nr(alloc) < (nr)) \ + alloc = (nr); \ + else \ + alloc = alloc_nr(alloc); \ + x = xrealloc((x), alloc * sizeof(*(x))); \ + } \ + } while(0) + +static inline void *xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t size) +{ + void *ret = realloc(ptr, size); + if (!ret) + die("Out of memory, realloc failed"); + return ret; +} + +#define astrcatf(out, fmt, ...) \ +({ \ + char *tmp = *(out); \ + if (asprintf((out), "%s" fmt, tmp ?: "", ## __VA_ARGS__) == -1) \ + die("asprintf failed"); \ + free(tmp); \ +}) + +static inline void astrcat(char **out, const char *add) +{ + char *tmp = *out; + + if (asprintf(out, "%s%s", tmp ?: "", add) == -1) + die("asprintf failed"); + + free(tmp); +} + +#endif /* __SUBCMD_UTIL_H */ |
