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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/subcmd/exec-cmd.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/subcmd/exec-cmd.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/lib/subcmd/exec-cmd.c | 218 |
1 files changed, 218 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/subcmd/exec-cmd.c b/tools/lib/subcmd/exec-cmd.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7739b5217 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/lib/subcmd/exec-cmd.c @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include "subcmd-util.h" +#include "exec-cmd.h" +#include "subcmd-config.h" + +#define MAX_ARGS 32 +#define PATH_MAX 4096 + +static const char *argv_exec_path; +static const char *argv0_path; + +void exec_cmd_init(const char *exec_name, const char *prefix, + const char *exec_path, const char *exec_path_env) +{ + subcmd_config.exec_name = exec_name; + subcmd_config.prefix = prefix; + subcmd_config.exec_path = exec_path; + subcmd_config.exec_path_env = exec_path_env; + + /* Setup environment variable for invoked shell script. */ + setenv("PREFIX", prefix, 1); +} + +#define is_dir_sep(c) ((c) == '/') + +static int is_absolute_path(const char *path) +{ + return path[0] == '/'; +} + +static const char *get_pwd_cwd(char *buf, size_t sz) +{ + char *pwd; + struct stat cwd_stat, pwd_stat; + if (getcwd(buf, sz) == NULL) + return NULL; + pwd = getenv("PWD"); + if (pwd && strcmp(pwd, buf)) { + stat(buf, &cwd_stat); + if (!stat(pwd, &pwd_stat) && + pwd_stat.st_dev == cwd_stat.st_dev && + pwd_stat.st_ino == cwd_stat.st_ino) { + strlcpy(buf, pwd, sz); + } + } + return buf; +} + +static const char *make_nonrelative_path(char *buf, size_t sz, const char *path) +{ + if (is_absolute_path(path)) { + if (strlcpy(buf, path, sz) >= sz) + die("Too long path: %.*s", 60, path); + } else { + const char *cwd = get_pwd_cwd(buf, sz); + + if (!cwd) + die("Cannot determine the current working directory"); + + if (strlen(cwd) + strlen(path) + 2 >= sz) + die("Too long path: %.*s", 60, path); + + strcat(buf, "/"); + strcat(buf, path); + } + return buf; +} + +char *system_path(const char *path) +{ + char *buf = NULL; + + if (is_absolute_path(path)) + return strdup(path); + + astrcatf(&buf, "%s/%s", subcmd_config.prefix, path); + + return buf; +} + +const char *extract_argv0_path(const char *argv0) +{ + const char *slash; + + if (!argv0 || !*argv0) + return NULL; + slash = argv0 + strlen(argv0); + + while (argv0 <= slash && !is_dir_sep(*slash)) + slash--; + + if (slash >= argv0) { + argv0_path = strndup(argv0, slash - argv0); + return argv0_path ? slash + 1 : NULL; + } + + return argv0; +} + +void set_argv_exec_path(const char *exec_path) +{ + argv_exec_path = exec_path; + /* + * Propagate this setting to external programs. + */ + setenv(subcmd_config.exec_path_env, exec_path, 1); +} + + +/* Returns the highest-priority location to look for subprograms. */ +char *get_argv_exec_path(void) +{ + char *env; + + if (argv_exec_path) + return strdup(argv_exec_path); + + env = getenv(subcmd_config.exec_path_env); + if (env && *env) + return strdup(env); + + return system_path(subcmd_config.exec_path); +} + +static void add_path(char **out, const char *path) +{ + if (path && *path) { + if (is_absolute_path(path)) + astrcat(out, path); + else { + char buf[PATH_MAX]; + + astrcat(out, make_nonrelative_path(buf, sizeof(buf), path)); + } + + astrcat(out, ":"); + } +} + +void setup_path(void) +{ + const char *old_path = getenv("PATH"); + char *new_path = NULL; + char *tmp = get_argv_exec_path(); + + add_path(&new_path, tmp); + add_path(&new_path, argv0_path); + free(tmp); + + if (old_path) + astrcat(&new_path, old_path); + else + astrcat(&new_path, "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"); + + setenv("PATH", new_path, 1); + + free(new_path); +} + +static const char **prepare_exec_cmd(const char **argv) +{ + int argc; + const char **nargv; + + for (argc = 0; argv[argc]; argc++) + ; /* just counting */ + nargv = malloc(sizeof(*nargv) * (argc + 2)); + + nargv[0] = subcmd_config.exec_name; + for (argc = 0; argv[argc]; argc++) + nargv[argc + 1] = argv[argc]; + nargv[argc + 1] = NULL; + return nargv; +} + +int execv_cmd(const char **argv) { + const char **nargv = prepare_exec_cmd(argv); + + /* execvp() can only ever return if it fails */ + execvp(subcmd_config.exec_name, (char **)nargv); + + free(nargv); + return -1; +} + + +int execl_cmd(const char *cmd,...) +{ + int argc; + const char *argv[MAX_ARGS + 1]; + const char *arg; + va_list param; + + va_start(param, cmd); + argv[0] = cmd; + argc = 1; + while (argc < MAX_ARGS) { + arg = argv[argc++] = va_arg(param, char *); + if (!arg) + break; + } + va_end(param); + if (MAX_ARGS <= argc) { + fprintf(stderr, " Error: too many args to run %s\n", cmd); + return -1; + } + + argv[argc] = NULL; + return execv_cmd(argv); +} |
