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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/slab.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/slab.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/lib/slab.c54
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/slab.c b/tools/lib/slab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..981a21404
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/lib/slab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <urcu/uatomic.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+
+int kmalloc_nr_allocated;
+int kmalloc_verbose;
+
+void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ void *ret;
+
+ if (!(gfp & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM))
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = malloc(size);
+ uatomic_inc(&kmalloc_nr_allocated);
+ if (kmalloc_verbose)
+ printf("Allocating %p from malloc\n", ret);
+ if (gfp & __GFP_ZERO)
+ memset(ret, 0, size);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void kfree(void *p)
+{
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+ uatomic_dec(&kmalloc_nr_allocated);
+ if (kmalloc_verbose)
+ printf("Freeing %p to malloc\n", p);
+ free(p);
+}
+
+void *kmalloc_array(size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ void *ret;
+
+ if (!(gfp & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM))
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = calloc(n, size);
+ uatomic_inc(&kmalloc_nr_allocated);
+ if (kmalloc_verbose)
+ printf("Allocating %p from calloc\n", ret);
+ if (gfp & __GFP_ZERO)
+ memset(ret, 0, n * size);
+ return ret;
+}