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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/perf/lib.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/perf/lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/lib/perf/lib.c | 68 |
1 files changed, 68 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/perf/lib.c b/tools/lib/perf/lib.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..696fb0ea6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/lib/perf/lib.c @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <unistd.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <internal/lib.h> + +unsigned int page_size; + +static ssize_t ion(bool is_read, int fd, void *buf, size_t n) +{ + void *buf_start = buf; + size_t left = n; + + while (left) { + /* buf must be treated as const if !is_read. */ + ssize_t ret = is_read ? read(fd, buf, left) : + write(fd, buf, left); + + if (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR) + continue; + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + + left -= ret; + buf += ret; + } + + BUG_ON((size_t)(buf - buf_start) != n); + return n; +} + +/* + * Read exactly 'n' bytes or return an error. + */ +ssize_t readn(int fd, void *buf, size_t n) +{ + return ion(true, fd, buf, n); +} + +ssize_t preadn(int fd, void *buf, size_t n, off_t offs) +{ + size_t left = n; + + while (left) { + ssize_t ret = pread(fd, buf, left, offs); + + if (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR) + continue; + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + + left -= ret; + buf += ret; + offs += ret; + } + + return n; +} + +/* + * Write exactly 'n' bytes or return an error. + */ +ssize_t writen(int fd, const void *buf, size_t n) +{ + /* ion does not modify buf. */ + return ion(false, fd, (void *)buf, n); +} |
