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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/perf/TODO
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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+Future ABI changes
+==================
+
+This file collects items that require a libperf ABI bump. Each entry
+should describe the current limitation, the desired end state, and the
+scope of the change so that a future ABI revision can batch them
+together.
+
+1. Widen struct perf_cpu.cpu from int16_t to int
+ - Current limit: 32767 CPUs. No architecture exceeds this today
+ (x86_64 max is 8192, arm64 is 4096), but NR_CPUS limits keep
+ growing. perf clamps to INT16_MAX in set_max_cpu_num() as a
+ safety net.
+ - Code simplification: the int16_t forces defensive truncation
+ checks at every boundary where a wider CPU index (int from
+ sample->cpu, al->cpu, etc.) is narrowed into struct perf_cpu.
+ Without these checks, values > 32767 silently wrap to negative
+ numbers (two's complement), bypassing bounds validation.
+ Widening to int eliminates this entire class of silent
+ truncation bugs and removes the need for the INT16_MAX clamp
+ in set_max_cpu_num().
+ - Scope: struct perf_cpu is embedded everywhere — perf_cpu_map__cpu(),
+ perf_cpu_map__min(), perf_cpu_map__max(), perf_cpu_map__has(), the
+ for_each_cpu macros, and all internal callers. The perf_cpu_map
+ internal array (RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->map[]) stores struct perf_cpu
+ directly. Widening changes the struct layout and every function
+ that returns or accepts struct perf_cpu by value.
+ - Migration: bump LIBPERF version in libperf.map, audit all
+ sizeof(struct perf_cpu) assumptions, update perf.data
+ serialization if needed.