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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/perf/TODO | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/perf/TODO')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/lib/perf/TODO | 30 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/perf/TODO b/tools/lib/perf/TODO new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e17972869 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/lib/perf/TODO @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +Future ABI changes +================== + +This file collects items that require a libperf ABI bump. Each entry +should describe the current limitation, the desired end state, and the +scope of the change so that a future ABI revision can batch them +together. + +1. Widen struct perf_cpu.cpu from int16_t to int + - Current limit: 32767 CPUs. No architecture exceeds this today + (x86_64 max is 8192, arm64 is 4096), but NR_CPUS limits keep + growing. perf clamps to INT16_MAX in set_max_cpu_num() as a + safety net. + - Code simplification: the int16_t forces defensive truncation + checks at every boundary where a wider CPU index (int from + sample->cpu, al->cpu, etc.) is narrowed into struct perf_cpu. + Without these checks, values > 32767 silently wrap to negative + numbers (two's complement), bypassing bounds validation. + Widening to int eliminates this entire class of silent + truncation bugs and removes the need for the INT16_MAX clamp + in set_max_cpu_num(). + - Scope: struct perf_cpu is embedded everywhere — perf_cpu_map__cpu(), + perf_cpu_map__min(), perf_cpu_map__max(), perf_cpu_map__has(), the + for_each_cpu macros, and all internal callers. The perf_cpu_map + internal array (RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->map[]) stores struct perf_cpu + directly. Widening changes the struct layout and every function + that returns or accepts struct perf_cpu by value. + - Migration: bump LIBPERF version in libperf.map, audit all + sizeof(struct perf_cpu) assumptions, update perf.data + serialization if needed. |
