staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 21 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/strset.h b/tools/lib/bpf/strset.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b6ddf77a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/strset.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (LGPL-2.1 OR BSD-2-Clause) */
+
+/* Copyright (c) 2021 Facebook */
+#ifndef __LIBBPF_STRSET_H
+#define __LIBBPF_STRSET_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+struct strset;
+
+struct strset *strset__new(size_t max_data_sz, const char *init_data, size_t init_data_sz);
+void strset__free(struct strset *set);
+
+const char *strset__data(const struct strset *set);
+size_t strset__data_size(const struct strset *set);
+
+int strset__find_str(struct strset *set, const char *s);
+int strset__add_str(struct strset *set, const char *s);
+
+#endif /* __LIBBPF_STRSET_H */