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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/bpf/nlattr.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/bpf/nlattr.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/lib/bpf/nlattr.c | 194 |
1 files changed, 194 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/nlattr.c b/tools/lib/bpf/nlattr.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..007fe17d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/nlattr.c @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (LGPL-2.1 OR BSD-2-Clause) + +/* + * NETLINK Netlink attributes + * + * Copyright (c) 2003-2013 Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> + */ + +#include <errno.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <linux/rtnetlink.h> +#include "nlattr.h" +#include "libbpf_internal.h" + +static uint16_t nla_attr_minlen[LIBBPF_NLA_TYPE_MAX+1] = { + [LIBBPF_NLA_U8] = sizeof(uint8_t), + [LIBBPF_NLA_U16] = sizeof(uint16_t), + [LIBBPF_NLA_U32] = sizeof(uint32_t), + [LIBBPF_NLA_U64] = sizeof(uint64_t), + [LIBBPF_NLA_STRING] = 1, + [LIBBPF_NLA_FLAG] = 0, +}; + +static struct nlattr *nla_next(const struct nlattr *nla, int *remaining) +{ + int totlen = NLA_ALIGN(nla->nla_len); + + *remaining -= totlen; + return (struct nlattr *)((void *)nla + totlen); +} + +static int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining) +{ + return remaining >= (int)sizeof(*nla) && + nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) && + nla->nla_len <= remaining; +} + +static int nla_type(const struct nlattr *nla) +{ + return nla->nla_type & NLA_TYPE_MASK; +} + +static int validate_nla(struct nlattr *nla, int maxtype, + struct libbpf_nla_policy *policy) +{ + struct libbpf_nla_policy *pt; + unsigned int minlen = 0; + int type = nla_type(nla); + + if (type < 0 || type > maxtype) + return 0; + + pt = &policy[type]; + + if (pt->type > LIBBPF_NLA_TYPE_MAX) + return 0; + + if (pt->minlen) + minlen = pt->minlen; + else if (pt->type != LIBBPF_NLA_UNSPEC) + minlen = nla_attr_minlen[pt->type]; + + if (libbpf_nla_len(nla) < minlen) + return -EINVAL; + + if (pt->maxlen && libbpf_nla_len(nla) > pt->maxlen) + return -EINVAL; + + if (pt->type == LIBBPF_NLA_STRING) { + char *data = libbpf_nla_data(nla); + + if (data[libbpf_nla_len(nla) - 1] != '\0') + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static inline int nlmsg_len(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh) +{ + return nlh->nlmsg_len - NLMSG_HDRLEN; +} + +/** + * Create attribute index based on a stream of attributes. + * @arg tb Index array to be filled (maxtype+1 elements). + * @arg maxtype Maximum attribute type expected and accepted. + * @arg head Head of attribute stream. + * @arg len Length of attribute stream. + * @arg policy Attribute validation policy. + * + * Iterates over the stream of attributes and stores a pointer to each + * attribute in the index array using the attribute type as index to + * the array. Attribute with a type greater than the maximum type + * specified will be silently ignored in order to maintain backwards + * compatibility. If \a policy is not NULL, the attribute will be + * validated using the specified policy. + * + * @see nla_validate + * @return 0 on success or a negative error code. + */ +int libbpf_nla_parse(struct nlattr *tb[], int maxtype, struct nlattr *head, + int len, struct libbpf_nla_policy *policy) +{ + struct nlattr *nla; + int rem, err; + + memset(tb, 0, sizeof(struct nlattr *) * (maxtype + 1)); + + libbpf_nla_for_each_attr(nla, head, len, rem) { + int type = nla_type(nla); + + if (type > maxtype) + continue; + + if (policy) { + err = validate_nla(nla, maxtype, policy); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } + + if (tb[type]) { + pr_warn("Attribute of type %#x found multiple times in message, " + "previous attribute is being ignored.\n", (unsigned)type); + } + + tb[type] = nla; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Create attribute index based on nested attribute + * @arg tb Index array to be filled (maxtype+1 elements). + * @arg maxtype Maximum attribute type expected and accepted. + * @arg nla Nested Attribute. + * @arg policy Attribute validation policy. + * + * Feeds the stream of attributes nested into the specified attribute + * to libbpf_nla_parse(). + * + * @see libbpf_nla_parse + * @return 0 on success or a negative error code. + */ +int libbpf_nla_parse_nested(struct nlattr *tb[], int maxtype, + struct nlattr *nla, + struct libbpf_nla_policy *policy) +{ + return libbpf_nla_parse(tb, maxtype, libbpf_nla_data(nla), + libbpf_nla_len(nla), policy); +} + +/* dump netlink extended ack error message */ +int libbpf_nla_dump_errormsg(struct nlmsghdr *nlh) +{ + struct libbpf_nla_policy extack_policy[NLMSGERR_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { + [NLMSGERR_ATTR_MSG] = { .type = LIBBPF_NLA_STRING }, + [NLMSGERR_ATTR_OFFS] = { .type = LIBBPF_NLA_U32 }, + }; + struct nlattr *tb[NLMSGERR_ATTR_MAX + 1], *attr; + struct nlmsgerr *err; + char *errmsg = NULL; + int hlen, alen; + + /* no TLVs, nothing to do here */ + if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_ACK_TLVS)) + return 0; + + err = (struct nlmsgerr *)NLMSG_DATA(nlh); + hlen = sizeof(*err); + + /* if NLM_F_CAPPED is set then the inner err msg was capped */ + if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CAPPED)) + hlen += nlmsg_len(&err->msg); + + attr = (struct nlattr *) ((void *) err + hlen); + alen = (void *)nlh + nlh->nlmsg_len - (void *)attr; + + if (libbpf_nla_parse(tb, NLMSGERR_ATTR_MAX, attr, alen, + extack_policy) != 0) { + pr_warn("Failed to parse extended error attributes\n"); + return 0; + } + + if (tb[NLMSGERR_ATTR_MSG]) + errmsg = (char *) libbpf_nla_data(tb[NLMSGERR_ATTR_MSG]); + + pr_warn("Kernel error message: %s\n", errmsg); + + return 0; +} |
