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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/argv_split.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/argv_split.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/lib/argv_split.c | 100 |
1 files changed, 100 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/argv_split.c b/tools/lib/argv_split.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0a58ccf3f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/lib/argv_split.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Helper function for splitting a string into an argv-like array. + */ + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +static const char *skip_arg(const char *cp) +{ + while (*cp && !isspace(*cp)) + cp++; + + return cp; +} + +static int count_argc(const char *str) +{ + int count = 0; + + while (*str) { + str = skip_spaces(str); + if (*str) { + count++; + str = skip_arg(str); + } + } + + return count; +} + +/** + * argv_free - free an argv + * @argv - the argument vector to be freed + * + * Frees an argv and the strings it points to. + */ +void argv_free(char **argv) +{ + char **p; + for (p = argv; *p; p++) { + free(*p); + *p = NULL; + } + + free(argv); +} + +/** + * argv_split - split a string at whitespace, returning an argv + * @str: the string to be split + * @argcp: returned argument count + * + * Returns an array of pointers to strings which are split out from + * @str. This is performed by strictly splitting on white-space; no + * quote processing is performed. Multiple whitespace characters are + * considered to be a single argument separator. The returned array + * is always NULL-terminated. Returns NULL on memory allocation + * failure. + */ +char **argv_split(const char *str, int *argcp) +{ + int argc = count_argc(str); + char **argv = calloc(argc + 1, sizeof(*argv)); + char **argvp; + + if (argv == NULL) + goto out; + + if (argcp) + *argcp = argc; + + argvp = argv; + + while (*str) { + str = skip_spaces(str); + + if (*str) { + const char *p = str; + char *t; + + str = skip_arg(str); + + t = strndup(p, str-p); + if (t == NULL) + goto fail; + *argvp++ = t; + } + } + *argvp = NULL; + +out: + return argv; + +fail: + argv_free(argv); + return NULL; +} |
