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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/argv_split.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/argv_split.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/lib/argv_split.c100
1 files changed, 100 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/argv_split.c b/tools/lib/argv_split.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0a58ccf3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/lib/argv_split.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Helper function for splitting a string into an argv-like array.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+static const char *skip_arg(const char *cp)
+{
+ while (*cp && !isspace(*cp))
+ cp++;
+
+ return cp;
+}
+
+static int count_argc(const char *str)
+{
+ int count = 0;
+
+ while (*str) {
+ str = skip_spaces(str);
+ if (*str) {
+ count++;
+ str = skip_arg(str);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+/**
+ * argv_free - free an argv
+ * @argv - the argument vector to be freed
+ *
+ * Frees an argv and the strings it points to.
+ */
+void argv_free(char **argv)
+{
+ char **p;
+ for (p = argv; *p; p++) {
+ free(*p);
+ *p = NULL;
+ }
+
+ free(argv);
+}
+
+/**
+ * argv_split - split a string at whitespace, returning an argv
+ * @str: the string to be split
+ * @argcp: returned argument count
+ *
+ * Returns an array of pointers to strings which are split out from
+ * @str. This is performed by strictly splitting on white-space; no
+ * quote processing is performed. Multiple whitespace characters are
+ * considered to be a single argument separator. The returned array
+ * is always NULL-terminated. Returns NULL on memory allocation
+ * failure.
+ */
+char **argv_split(const char *str, int *argcp)
+{
+ int argc = count_argc(str);
+ char **argv = calloc(argc + 1, sizeof(*argv));
+ char **argvp;
+
+ if (argv == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (argcp)
+ *argcp = argc;
+
+ argvp = argv;
+
+ while (*str) {
+ str = skip_spaces(str);
+
+ if (*str) {
+ const char *p = str;
+ char *t;
+
+ str = skip_arg(str);
+
+ t = strndup(p, str-p);
+ if (t == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ *argvp++ = t;
+ }
+ }
+ *argvp = NULL;
+
+out:
+ return argv;
+
+fail:
+ argv_free(argv);
+ return NULL;
+}