summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/tools/debugging
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/debugging
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/debugging')
-rw-r--r--tools/debugging/Makefile16
-rwxr-xr-xtools/debugging/kernel-chktaint235
2 files changed, 251 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/debugging/Makefile b/tools/debugging/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e2b7c1a6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/debugging/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+# Makefile for debugging tools
+
+PREFIX ?= /usr
+BINDIR ?= bin
+INSTALL ?= install
+
+TARGET = kernel-chktaint
+
+all: $(TARGET)
+
+clean:
+
+install: kernel-chktaint
+ $(INSTALL) -D -m 755 $(TARGET) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/$(TARGET)
+
diff --git a/tools/debugging/kernel-chktaint b/tools/debugging/kernel-chktaint
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..e1571c04a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/debugging/kernel-chktaint
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>, 2018
+# Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info>, 2018
+
+usage()
+{
+ cat <<EOF
+usage: ${0##*/}
+ ${0##*/} <int>
+
+Call without parameters to decode /proc/sys/kernel/tainted.
+
+Call with a positive integer as parameter to decode a value you
+retrieved from /proc/sys/kernel/tainted on another system.
+
+EOF
+}
+
+if [ "$1"x != "x" ]; then
+ if [ "$1"x == "--helpx" ] || [ "$1"x == "-hx" ] ; then
+ usage
+ exit 1
+ elif [ $1 -ge 0 ] 2>/dev/null ; then
+ taint=$1
+ else
+ echo "Error: Parameter '$1' not a positive integer. Aborting." >&2
+ exit 1
+ fi
+else
+ TAINTFILE="/proc/sys/kernel/tainted"
+ if [ ! -r $TAINTFILE ]; then
+ echo "No file: $TAINTFILE"
+ exit
+ fi
+
+ taint=`cat $TAINTFILE`
+fi
+
+if [ $taint -eq 0 ]; then
+ echo "Kernel not Tainted"
+ exit
+else
+ echo "Kernel is \"tainted\" for the following reasons:"
+fi
+
+T=$taint
+out=
+
+addout() {
+ out=$out$1
+}
+
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout "G"
+else
+ addout "P"
+ echo " * proprietary module was loaded (#0)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "F"
+ echo " * module was force loaded (#1)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "S"
+ echo " * kernel running on an out of specification system (#2)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "R"
+ echo " * module was force unloaded (#3)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "M"
+ echo " * processor reported a Machine Check Exception (MCE) (#4)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "B"
+ echo " * bad page referenced or some unexpected page flags (#5)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "U"
+ echo " * taint requested by userspace application (#6)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "D"
+ echo " * kernel died recently, i.e. there was an OOPS or BUG (#7)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "A"
+ echo " * an ACPI table was overridden by user (#8)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "W"
+ echo " * kernel issued warning (#9)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "C"
+ echo " * staging driver was loaded (#10)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "I"
+ echo " * workaround for bug in platform firmware applied (#11)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "O"
+ echo " * externally-built ('out-of-tree') module was loaded (#12)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "E"
+ echo " * unsigned module was loaded (#13)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "L"
+ echo " * soft lockup occurred (#14)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "K"
+ echo " * kernel has been live patched (#15)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "X"
+ echo " * auxiliary taint, defined for and used by distros (#16)"
+
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "T"
+ echo " * kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin (#17)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "N"
+ echo " * an in-kernel test (such as a KUnit test) has been run (#18)"
+fi
+
+T=`expr $T / 2`
+if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then
+ addout " "
+else
+ addout "J"
+ echo " * fwctl's mutating debug interface was used (#19)"
+fi
+echo "Raw taint value as int/string: $taint/'$out'"
+
+# report on any tainted loadable modules
+[ "$1" = "" ] && [ -r /sys/module/ ] && \
+ cnt=`grep [A-Z] /sys/module/*/taint | wc -l` || cnt=0
+
+if [ $cnt -ne 0 ]; then
+ echo
+ echo "Tainted modules:"
+ for dir in `ls /sys/module` ; do
+ if [ -r /sys/module/$dir/taint ]; then
+ modtnt=`cat /sys/module/$dir/taint`
+ [ "$modtnt" = "" ] || echo " * $dir ($modtnt)"
+ fi
+ done
+fi
+
+echo
+echo "For a more detailed explanation of the various taint flags see"
+echo " Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst in the Linux kernel sources"
+echo " or https://kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.html"
+#EOF#