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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py | 64 |
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py b/tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2b91415b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +#!/usr/bin/python3 +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +import ctypes +import os + +DBC_UID_SIZE = 16 +DBC_NONCE_SIZE = 16 +DBC_SIG_SIZE = 32 + +PARAM_GET_FMAX_CAP = (0x3,) +PARAM_SET_FMAX_CAP = (0x4,) +PARAM_GET_PWR_CAP = (0x5,) +PARAM_SET_PWR_CAP = (0x6,) +PARAM_GET_GFX_MODE = (0x7,) +PARAM_SET_GFX_MODE = (0x8,) +PARAM_GET_CURR_TEMP = (0x9,) +PARAM_GET_FMAX_MAX = (0xA,) +PARAM_GET_FMAX_MIN = (0xB,) +PARAM_GET_SOC_PWR_MAX = (0xC,) +PARAM_GET_SOC_PWR_MIN = (0xD,) +PARAM_GET_SOC_PWR_CUR = (0xE,) + +DEVICE_NODE = "/dev/dbc" + +lib = ctypes.CDLL("./dbc_library.so", mode=ctypes.RTLD_GLOBAL) + + +def handle_error(code): + raise OSError(code, os.strerror(code)) + + +def get_nonce(device, signature): + if not device: + raise ValueError("Device required") + buf = ctypes.create_string_buffer(DBC_NONCE_SIZE) + ret = lib.get_nonce(device.fileno(), ctypes.byref(buf), signature) + if ret: + handle_error(ret) + return buf.value + + +def set_uid(device, new_uid, signature): + if not signature: + raise ValueError("Signature required") + if not new_uid: + raise ValueError("UID required") + ret = lib.set_uid(device.fileno(), new_uid, signature) + if ret: + handle_error(ret) + return True + + +def process_param(device, message, signature, data=None): + if not signature: + raise ValueError("Signature required") + if type(message) != tuple: + raise ValueError("Expected message tuple") + arg = ctypes.c_int(data if data else 0) + sig = ctypes.create_string_buffer(signature, len(signature)) + ret = lib.process_param(device.fileno(), message[0], ctypes.pointer(sig), ctypes.pointer(arg)) + if ret: + handle_error(ret) + return arg.value, sig.value |
