summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py')
-rw-r--r--tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py64
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py b/tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2b91415b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.py
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python3
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+import ctypes
+import os
+
+DBC_UID_SIZE = 16
+DBC_NONCE_SIZE = 16
+DBC_SIG_SIZE = 32
+
+PARAM_GET_FMAX_CAP = (0x3,)
+PARAM_SET_FMAX_CAP = (0x4,)
+PARAM_GET_PWR_CAP = (0x5,)
+PARAM_SET_PWR_CAP = (0x6,)
+PARAM_GET_GFX_MODE = (0x7,)
+PARAM_SET_GFX_MODE = (0x8,)
+PARAM_GET_CURR_TEMP = (0x9,)
+PARAM_GET_FMAX_MAX = (0xA,)
+PARAM_GET_FMAX_MIN = (0xB,)
+PARAM_GET_SOC_PWR_MAX = (0xC,)
+PARAM_GET_SOC_PWR_MIN = (0xD,)
+PARAM_GET_SOC_PWR_CUR = (0xE,)
+
+DEVICE_NODE = "/dev/dbc"
+
+lib = ctypes.CDLL("./dbc_library.so", mode=ctypes.RTLD_GLOBAL)
+
+
+def handle_error(code):
+ raise OSError(code, os.strerror(code))
+
+
+def get_nonce(device, signature):
+ if not device:
+ raise ValueError("Device required")
+ buf = ctypes.create_string_buffer(DBC_NONCE_SIZE)
+ ret = lib.get_nonce(device.fileno(), ctypes.byref(buf), signature)
+ if ret:
+ handle_error(ret)
+ return buf.value
+
+
+def set_uid(device, new_uid, signature):
+ if not signature:
+ raise ValueError("Signature required")
+ if not new_uid:
+ raise ValueError("UID required")
+ ret = lib.set_uid(device.fileno(), new_uid, signature)
+ if ret:
+ handle_error(ret)
+ return True
+
+
+def process_param(device, message, signature, data=None):
+ if not signature:
+ raise ValueError("Signature required")
+ if type(message) != tuple:
+ raise ValueError("Expected message tuple")
+ arg = ctypes.c_int(data if data else 0)
+ sig = ctypes.create_string_buffer(signature, len(signature))
+ ret = lib.process_param(device.fileno(), message[0], ctypes.pointer(sig), ctypes.pointer(arg))
+ if ret:
+ handle_error(ret)
+ return arg.value, sig.value