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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.c | 72 |
1 files changed, 72 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.c b/tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..80248d3d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/crypto/ccp/dbc.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AMD Secure Processor Dynamic Boost Control sample library + * + * Copyright (C) 2023 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/ioctl.h> + +/* if uapi header isn't installed, this might not yet exist */ +#ifndef __packed +#define __packed __attribute__((packed)) +#endif +#include <linux/psp-dbc.h> + +int get_nonce(int fd, void *nonce_out, void *signature) +{ + struct dbc_user_nonce tmp = { + .auth_needed = !!signature, + }; + + assert(nonce_out); + + if (signature) + memcpy(tmp.signature, signature, sizeof(tmp.signature)); + + if (ioctl(fd, DBCIOCNONCE, &tmp)) + return errno; + memcpy(nonce_out, tmp.nonce, sizeof(tmp.nonce)); + + return 0; +} + +int set_uid(int fd, __u8 *uid, __u8 *signature) +{ + struct dbc_user_setuid tmp; + + assert(uid); + assert(signature); + + memcpy(tmp.uid, uid, sizeof(tmp.uid)); + memcpy(tmp.signature, signature, sizeof(tmp.signature)); + + if (ioctl(fd, DBCIOCUID, &tmp)) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +int process_param(int fd, int msg_index, __u8 *signature, int *data) +{ + struct dbc_user_param tmp = { + .msg_index = msg_index, + .param = *data, + }; + + assert(signature); + assert(data); + + memcpy(tmp.signature, signature, sizeof(tmp.signature)); + + if (ioctl(fd, DBCIOCPARAM, &tmp)) + return errno; + + *data = tmp.param; + memcpy(signature, tmp.signature, sizeof(tmp.signature)); + return 0; +} |
