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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/build/tests/run.sh
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/build/tests/run.sh')
-rwxr-xr-xtools/build/tests/run.sh70
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/build/tests/run.sh b/tools/build/tests/run.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..2c54e4d43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/build/tests/run.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+function test_ex {
+ make -C ex V=1 clean > ex.out 2>&1
+ make -C ex V=1 >> ex.out 2>&1
+
+ if [ ! -x ./ex/ex ]; then
+ echo FAILED
+ exit -1
+ fi
+
+ make -C ex V=1 clean > /dev/null 2>&1
+ rm -f ex.out
+}
+
+function test_ex_suffix {
+ make -C ex V=1 clean > ex.out 2>&1
+
+ # use -rR to disable make's builtin rules
+ make -rR -C ex V=1 ex.o >> ex.out 2>&1
+ make -rR -C ex V=1 ex.i >> ex.out 2>&1
+ make -rR -C ex V=1 ex.s >> ex.out 2>&1
+
+ if [ -x ./ex/ex ]; then
+ echo FAILED
+ exit -1
+ fi
+
+ if [ ! -f ./ex/ex.o -o ! -f ./ex/ex.i -o ! -f ./ex/ex.s ]; then
+ echo FAILED
+ exit -1
+ fi
+
+ make -C ex V=1 clean > /dev/null 2>&1
+ rm -f ex.out
+}
+
+function test_ex_include {
+ make -C ex V=1 clean > ex.out 2>&1
+
+ # build with krava.h include
+ touch ex/krava.h
+ make -C ex V=1 CFLAGS=-DINCLUDE >> ex.out 2>&1
+
+ if [ ! -x ./ex/ex ]; then
+ echo FAILED
+ exit -1
+ fi
+
+ # build without the include
+ rm -f ex/krava.h ex/ex
+ make -C ex V=1 >> ex.out 2>&1
+
+ if [ ! -x ./ex/ex ]; then
+ echo FAILED
+ exit -1
+ fi
+
+ make -C ex V=1 clean > /dev/null 2>&1
+ rm -f ex.out
+}
+
+echo -n Testing..
+
+test_ex
+test_ex_suffix
+test_ex_include
+
+echo OK