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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/bpf/bpf_asm.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/bpf/bpf_asm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/bpf/bpf_asm.c | 52 |
1 files changed, 52 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpf_asm.c b/tools/bpf/bpf_asm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0063c3c02 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/bpf/bpf_asm.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Minimal BPF assembler + * + * Instead of libpcap high-level filter expressions, it can be quite + * useful to define filters in low-level BPF assembler (that is kept + * close to Steven McCanne and Van Jacobson's original BPF paper). + * In particular for BPF JIT implementors, JIT security auditors, or + * just for defining BPF expressions that contain extensions which are + * not supported by compilers. + * + * How to get into it: + * + * 1) read Documentation/networking/filter.rst + * 2) Run `bpf_asm [-c] <filter-prog file>` to translate into binary + * blob that is loadable with xt_bpf, cls_bpf et al. Note: -c will + * pretty print a C-like construct. + * + * Copyright 2013 Daniel Borkmann <borkmann@redhat.com> + */ + +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> + +extern void bpf_asm_compile(FILE *fp, bool cstyle); + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + FILE *fp = stdin; + bool cstyle = false; + int i; + + for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { + if (!strncmp("-c", argv[i], 2)) { + cstyle = true; + continue; + } + + fp = fopen(argv[i], "r"); + if (!fp) { + fp = stdin; + continue; + } + + break; + } + + bpf_asm_compile(fp, cstyle); + + return 0; +} |
