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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /security/tomoyo/Makefile | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/tomoyo/Makefile')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/Makefile | 21 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e3c0f853a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +CONTEXT_ANALYSIS := y + +obj-y = audit.o common.o condition.o domain.o environ.o file.o gc.o group.o load_policy.o memory.o mount.o network.o realpath.o securityfs_if.o tomoyo.o util.o + +targets += builtin-policy.h + +quiet_cmd_policy = POLICY $@ + cmd_policy = { \ + $(foreach x, profile exception_policy domain_policy manager stat, \ + printf 'static char tomoyo_builtin_$x[] __initdata =\n'; \ + sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/\t"\1\\n"/' -- $(firstword $(filter %/$x.conf %/$x.conf.default, $^) /dev/null); \ + printf '\t"";\n';) \ + } > $@ + +$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/*.conf $(src)/policy/*.conf.default) FORCE + $(call if_changed,policy) + +ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_INSECURE_BUILTIN_SETTING +$(obj)/common.o: $(obj)/builtin-policy.h +endif |