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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /security/tomoyo/Kconfig | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/tomoyo/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/Kconfig | 85 |
1 files changed, 85 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1e0dd1a6d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +config SECURITY_TOMOYO + bool "TOMOYO Linux Support" + depends on SECURITY + depends on NET + select SECURITYFS + select SECURITY_PATH + select SECURITY_NETWORK + default n + help + This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control. + Required userspace tools and further information may be + found at <https://tomoyo.sourceforge.net/>. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY + int "Default maximal count for learning mode" + default 2048 + range 0 2147483647 + depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO + help + This is the default value for maximal ACL entries + that are automatically appended into policy at "learning mode". + Some programs access thousands of objects, so running + such programs in "learning mode" dulls the system response + and consumes much memory. + This is the safeguard for such programs. + +config SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_AUDIT_LOG + int "Default maximal count for audit log" + default 1024 + range 0 2147483647 + depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO + help + This is the default value for maximal entries for + audit logs that the kernel can hold on memory. + You can read the log via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit. + If you don't need audit logs, you may set this value to 0. + +config SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER + bool "Activate without calling userspace policy loader." + default n + depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO + help + Say Y here if you want to activate access control as soon as built-in + policy was loaded. This option will be useful for systems where + operations which can lead to the hijacking of the boot sequence are + needed before loading the policy. For example, you can activate + immediately after loading the fixed part of policy which will allow + only operations needed for mounting a partition which contains the + variant part of policy and verifying (e.g. running GPG check) and + loading the variant part of policy. Since you can start using + enforcing mode from the beginning, you can reduce the possibility of + hijacking the boot sequence. + +config SECURITY_TOMOYO_POLICY_LOADER + string "Location of userspace policy loader" + default "/sbin/tomoyo-init" + depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO + depends on !SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER + help + This is the default pathname of policy loader which is called before + activation. You can override this setting via TOMOYO_loader= kernel + command line option. + +config SECURITY_TOMOYO_ACTIVATION_TRIGGER + string "Trigger for calling userspace policy loader" + default "/sbin/init" + depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO + depends on !SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER + help + This is the default pathname of activation trigger. + You can override this setting via TOMOYO_trigger= kernel command line + option. For example, if you pass init=/bin/systemd option, you may + want to also pass TOMOYO_trigger=/bin/systemd option. + +config SECURITY_TOMOYO_INSECURE_BUILTIN_SETTING + bool "Use insecure built-in settings for fuzzing tests." + default n + depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO + select SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER + help + Enabling this option forces minimal built-in policy and disables + domain/program checks for run-time policy modifications. Please enable + this option only if this kernel is built for doing fuzzing tests. |
