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authorSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>2026-09-02 09:55:01 -0400
committerSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>2026-09-02 11:08:21 -0400
commit4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 (patch)
tree350aa83b47da0b574a814795392b20b0bed83cbc /security/safesetid/securityfs.c
downloadlinux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.tar.gz
linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.zip
ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_opsgrafted
There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other call. Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after the mute is taken in case of races. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock") Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/safesetid/securityfs.c')
-rw-r--r--security/safesetid/securityfs.c347
1 files changed, 347 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a71e54806
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+
+#include "lsm.h"
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(uid_policy_update_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(gid_policy_update_lock);
+
+/*
+ * In the case the input buffer contains one or more invalid IDs, the kid_t
+ * variables pointed to by @parent and @child will get updated but this
+ * function will return an error.
+ * Contents of @buf may be modified.
+ */
+static int parse_policy_line(struct file *file, char *buf,
+ struct setid_rule *rule)
+{
+ char *child_str;
+ int ret;
+ u32 parsed_parent, parsed_child;
+
+ /* Format of |buf| string should be <UID>:<UID> or <GID>:<GID> */
+ child_str = strchr(buf, ':');
+ if (child_str == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *child_str = '\0';
+ child_str++;
+
+ ret = kstrtou32(buf, 0, &parsed_parent);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = kstrtou32(child_str, 0, &parsed_child);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (rule->type == UID){
+ rule->src_id.uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent);
+ rule->dst_id.uid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child);
+ if (!uid_valid(rule->src_id.uid) || !uid_valid(rule->dst_id.uid))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (rule->type == GID){
+ rule->src_id.gid = make_kgid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent);
+ rule->dst_id.gid = make_kgid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child);
+ if (!gid_valid(rule->src_id.gid) || !gid_valid(rule->dst_id.gid))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ /* Error, rule->type is an invalid type */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __release_ruleset(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+ struct setid_ruleset *pol =
+ container_of(rcu, struct setid_ruleset, rcu);
+ int bucket;
+ struct setid_rule *rule;
+ struct hlist_node *tmp;
+
+ hash_for_each_safe(pol->rules, bucket, tmp, rule, next)
+ kfree(rule);
+ kfree(pol->policy_str);
+ kfree(pol);
+}
+
+static void release_ruleset(struct setid_ruleset *pol){
+ call_rcu(&pol->rcu, __release_ruleset);
+}
+
+static void insert_rule(struct setid_ruleset *pol, struct setid_rule *rule)
+{
+ if (pol->type == UID)
+ hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kuid_val(rule->src_id.uid));
+ else if (pol->type == GID)
+ hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kgid_val(rule->src_id.gid));
+ else /* Error, pol->type is neither UID or GID */
+ return;
+}
+
+static int verify_ruleset(struct setid_ruleset *pol)
+{
+ int bucket;
+ struct setid_rule *rule, *nrule;
+ int res = 0;
+
+ hash_for_each(pol->rules, bucket, rule, next) {
+ if (_setid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->dst_id, INVALID_ID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT) {
+ if (pol->type == UID) {
+ pr_warn("insecure policy detected: uid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through uid %d\n",
+ __kuid_val(rule->src_id.uid),
+ __kuid_val(rule->dst_id.uid));
+ } else if (pol->type == GID) {
+ pr_warn("insecure policy detected: gid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through gid %d\n",
+ __kgid_val(rule->src_id.gid),
+ __kgid_val(rule->dst_id.gid));
+ } else { /* pol->type is an invalid type */
+ res = -EINVAL;
+ return res;
+ }
+ res = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* fix it up */
+ nrule = kmalloc_obj(struct setid_rule);
+ if (!nrule)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (pol->type == UID){
+ nrule->src_id.uid = rule->dst_id.uid;
+ nrule->dst_id.uid = rule->dst_id.uid;
+ nrule->type = UID;
+ } else { /* pol->type must be GID if we've made it to here */
+ nrule->src_id.gid = rule->dst_id.gid;
+ nrule->dst_id.gid = rule->dst_id.gid;
+ nrule->type = GID;
+ }
+ insert_rule(pol, nrule);
+ }
+ }
+ return res;
+}
+
+static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *ubuf, size_t len, enum setid_type policy_type)
+{
+ struct setid_ruleset *pol;
+ char *buf, *p, *end;
+ int err;
+
+ if (len >= KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ pol = kmalloc_obj(struct setid_ruleset);
+ if (!pol)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ pol->policy_str = NULL;
+ pol->type = policy_type;
+ hash_init(pol->rules);
+
+ p = buf = memdup_user_nul(ubuf, len);
+ if (IS_ERR(buf)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(buf);
+ goto out_free_pol;
+ }
+ pol->policy_str = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (pol->policy_str == NULL) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_buf;
+ }
+
+ /* policy lines, including the last one, end with \n */
+ while (*p != '\0') {
+ struct setid_rule *rule;
+
+ end = strchr(p, '\n');
+ if (end == NULL) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free_buf;
+ }
+ *end = '\0';
+
+ rule = kmalloc_obj(struct setid_rule);
+ if (!rule) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_buf;
+ }
+
+ rule->type = policy_type;
+ err = parse_policy_line(file, p, rule);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free_rule;
+
+ if (_setid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->src_id, rule->dst_id) == SIDPOL_ALLOWED) {
+ pr_warn("bad policy: duplicate entry\n");
+ err = -EEXIST;
+ goto out_free_rule;
+ }
+
+ insert_rule(pol, rule);
+ p = end + 1;
+ continue;
+
+out_free_rule:
+ kfree(rule);
+ goto out_free_buf;
+ }
+
+ err = verify_ruleset(pol);
+ /* bogus policy falls through after fixing it up */
+ if (err && err != -EINVAL)
+ goto out_free_buf;
+
+ /*
+ * Everything looks good, apply the policy and release the old one.
+ * What we really want here is an xchg() wrapper for RCU, but since that
+ * doesn't currently exist, just use a spinlock for now.
+ */
+ if (policy_type == UID) {
+ mutex_lock(&uid_policy_update_lock);
+ pol = rcu_replace_pointer(safesetid_setuid_rules, pol,
+ lockdep_is_held(&uid_policy_update_lock));
+ mutex_unlock(&uid_policy_update_lock);
+ } else if (policy_type == GID) {
+ mutex_lock(&gid_policy_update_lock);
+ pol = rcu_replace_pointer(safesetid_setgid_rules, pol,
+ lockdep_is_held(&gid_policy_update_lock));
+ mutex_unlock(&gid_policy_update_lock);
+ } else {
+ /* Error, policy type is neither UID or GID */
+ pr_warn("error: bad policy type");
+ }
+ err = len;
+
+out_free_buf:
+ kfree(buf);
+out_free_pol:
+ if (pol)
+ release_ruleset(pol);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_uid_file_write(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *buf,
+ size_t len,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return handle_policy_update(file, buf, len, UID);
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_gid_file_write(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *buf,
+ size_t len,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return handle_policy_update(file, buf, len, GID);
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t len, loff_t *ppos, struct mutex *policy_update_lock, struct __rcu setid_ruleset* ruleset)
+{
+ ssize_t res = 0;
+ struct setid_ruleset *pol;
+ const char *kbuf;
+
+ mutex_lock(policy_update_lock);
+ pol = rcu_dereference_protected(ruleset, lockdep_is_held(policy_update_lock));
+ if (pol) {
+ kbuf = pol->policy_str;
+ res = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, ppos,
+ kbuf, strlen(kbuf));
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(policy_update_lock);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_uid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return safesetid_file_read(file, buf, len, ppos,
+ &uid_policy_update_lock, safesetid_setuid_rules);
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_gid_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return safesetid_file_read(file, buf, len, ppos,
+ &gid_policy_update_lock, safesetid_setgid_rules);
+}
+
+
+
+static const struct file_operations safesetid_uid_file_fops = {
+ .read = safesetid_uid_file_read,
+ .write = safesetid_uid_file_write,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations safesetid_gid_file_fops = {
+ .read = safesetid_gid_file_read,
+ .write = safesetid_gid_file_write,
+};
+
+int __init safesetid_init_securityfs(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct dentry *policy_dir;
+ struct dentry *uid_policy_file;
+ struct dentry *gid_policy_file;
+
+ if (!safesetid_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ policy_dir = securityfs_create_dir("safesetid", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(policy_dir)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(policy_dir);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ uid_policy_file = securityfs_create_file("uid_allowlist_policy", 0600,
+ policy_dir, NULL, &safesetid_uid_file_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(uid_policy_file)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(uid_policy_file);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ gid_policy_file = securityfs_create_file("gid_allowlist_policy", 0600,
+ policy_dir, NULL, &safesetid_gid_file_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(gid_policy_file)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(gid_policy_file);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ securityfs_remove(policy_dir);
+ return ret;
+}