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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /security/min_addr.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/min_addr.c')
-rw-r--r--security/min_addr.c62
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..56e4f9d25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/min_addr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/minmax.h>
+
+/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access by both DAC and the LSM*/
+unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
+/* amount of vm to protect from userspace using CAP_SYS_RAWIO (DAC) */
+unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
+/* amount of vm to protect from userspace using the LSM = CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR */
+
+/*
+ * Update mmap_min_addr = max(dac_mmap_min_addr, CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR)
+ */
+static void update_mmap_min_addr(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+ mmap_min_addr = umax(dac_mmap_min_addr, CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR);
+#else
+ mmap_min_addr = dac_mmap_min_addr;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * sysctl handler which just sets dac_mmap_min_addr = the new value and then
+ * calls update_mmap_min_addr() so non MAP_FIXED hints get rounded properly
+ */
+int mmap_min_addr_handler(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+
+ update_mmap_min_addr();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct ctl_table min_addr_sysctl_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "mmap_min_addr",
+ .data = &dac_mmap_min_addr,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = mmap_min_addr_handler,
+ },
+};
+
+static int __init mmap_min_addr_init(void)
+{
+ register_sysctl_init("vm", min_addr_sysctl_table);
+ update_mmap_min_addr();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+pure_initcall(mmap_min_addr_init);