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| author | Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> | 2026-09-04 10:43:19 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2026-09-04 07:58:36 -0700 |
| commit | 6668ed271eaefaa63e686bdfbedaeb7b8e492722 (patch) | |
| tree | 58e8288fead484f6755ad0815fc74c3742663761 /security/min_addr.c | |
| download | linux-stable-6668ed271eaefaa63e686bdfbedaeb7b8e492722.tar.gz linux-stable-6668ed271eaefaa63e686bdfbedaeb7b8e492722.zip | |
selftests/bpf: Reject graph kptr use after RCU unlockgrafted
Add a sleepable verifier test that loads a graph-node local kptr in an
explicit RCU read-side critical section, then passes its node to
bpf_rbtree_remove() after the section ends.
Before the verifier fix, the stale NON_OWN_REF flag makes the node look like
a live borrowed reference and the program is accepted. After the fix, the
pointer is demoted without NON_OWN_REF and the graph kfunc argument is
rejected.
Also exercise a graph kptr loaded while a spin lock provides implicit RCU
protection. The pointer must be invalidated when the lock is released, which
guards the required ordering between non-owning-reference invalidation and
RCU demotion.
Update the existing fault-protected load test state description. The
post-unlock pointer no longer carries NON_OWN_REF, but remains readable
because the load is rewritten to use BPF_PROBE_MEM.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260904084325.52250-7-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/min_addr.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/min_addr.c | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..56e4f9d25 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/min_addr.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/minmax.h> + +/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access by both DAC and the LSM*/ +unsigned long mmap_min_addr; +/* amount of vm to protect from userspace using CAP_SYS_RAWIO (DAC) */ +unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR; +/* amount of vm to protect from userspace using the LSM = CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR */ + +/* + * Update mmap_min_addr = max(dac_mmap_min_addr, CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) + */ +static void update_mmap_min_addr(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR + mmap_min_addr = umax(dac_mmap_min_addr, CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR); +#else + mmap_min_addr = dac_mmap_min_addr; +#endif +} + +/* + * sysctl handler which just sets dac_mmap_min_addr = the new value and then + * calls update_mmap_min_addr() so non MAP_FIXED hints get rounded properly + */ +int mmap_min_addr_handler(const struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + int ret; + + if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + return -EPERM; + + ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + + update_mmap_min_addr(); + + return ret; +} + +static const struct ctl_table min_addr_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "mmap_min_addr", + .data = &dac_mmap_min_addr, + .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = mmap_min_addr_handler, + }, +}; + +static int __init mmap_min_addr_init(void) +{ + register_sysctl_init("vm", min_addr_sysctl_table); + update_mmap_min_addr(); + + return 0; +} +pure_initcall(mmap_min_addr_init); |
