diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /security/lsm.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/lsm.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/lsm.h | 50 |
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/lsm.h b/security/lsm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..32f808ad4 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/lsm.h @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * LSM functions + */ + +#ifndef _LSM_H_ +#define _LSM_H_ + +#include <linux/printk.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> +#include <linux/lsm_count.h> + +/* LSM debugging */ +extern bool lsm_debug; +#define lsm_pr(...) pr_info(__VA_ARGS__) +#define lsm_pr_cont(...) pr_cont(__VA_ARGS__) +#define lsm_pr_dbg(...) \ + do { \ + if (lsm_debug) \ + pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ + } while (0) + +/* List of configured LSMs */ +extern unsigned int lsm_active_cnt; +extern const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[]; + +/* LSM blob configuration */ +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes; + +/* LSM blob caches */ +extern struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; +extern struct kmem_cache *lsm_backing_file_cache; +extern struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; + +/* LSM blob allocators */ +int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); +int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task); + +/* LSM framework initializers */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS +int securityfs_init(void); +#else +static inline int securityfs_init(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITYFS */ + +#endif /* _LSM_H_ */ |
