Merge branches 'expcb.2026.07.24a', 'misc.2026.07.30a', 'rcu-tasks.2026.07.30a', 'srcu.2026.08.11a' and 'torture.2026.08.14a' into HEADgrafted

Changes:

Make expedited grace periods expedite normal RCU callbacks

Miscellaneous fixes:
 * Improve diagnostic output with character task states.
 * Mark accesses to inform KCSAN of concurrency design.
 * Move from kmalloc() to kmalloc_obj().
 * Documentation updates.
 * Improve handling of RCU deferred quiescent states.
 * Clean up unused function arguments and structure fields.
 * Reduce show_rcu_gp_kthreads() stack space.

Tasks RCU updates:
 * Clean up after SRCU re-implementation of Tasks Trace RCU.
 * Mark accesses to inform KCSAN of concurrency design.
 * Add ->lazy_timer status to diagnostic output.
 * Remove an unnecessary memory barrier.
 * Fix a data race, courtesy of KCSAN.
 * Documentation updates.
 * Convert cond_resched_tasks_rcu_qs() from macro to static inline
   function.

SRCU updates:
 * Add Rust helpers for SRCU.
 * Avoid losing queued work at cleanup_srcu_struct() time.

Torture-test updates:
 * Preparation work for immediate RCU priority deboosting.
 * Test RCU readers from real interrupt handlers (as opposed to softirq).
 * Simplify code through use of cpumask_next_wrap().
 * Improve diagnostic output with character task states.
 * Add rcutorture.nwriters parameter to allow lightweight stall testing,
   and rcutorture.stall_only to make doing so easier.
 * Test an RCU Tasks Trace grace period implying an RCU grace period.
 * Make RCU Tasks Trace torturing track reader batches.
 * Fix a data race, courtesy of KCSAN.
 * Plug a shuffle_tmp_mask memory leak on kthread spawn failure.

1 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/lockdown/Kconfig b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e84ddf484
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
+	bool "Basic module for enforcing kernel lockdown"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select MODULE_SIG if MODULES
+	help
+	  Build support for an LSM that enforces a coarse kernel lockdown
+	  behaviour.
+
+config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
+	bool "Enable lockdown LSM early in init"
+	depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
+	help
+	  Enable the lockdown LSM early in boot. This is necessary in order
+	  to ensure that lockdown enforcement can be carried out on kernel
+	  boot parameters that are otherwise parsed before the security
+	  subsystem is fully initialised. If enabled, lockdown will
+	  unconditionally be called before any other LSMs.
+
+choice
+	prompt "Kernel default lockdown mode"
+	default LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE
+	depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
+	help
+	  The kernel can be configured to default to differing levels of
+	  lockdown.
+
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE
+	bool "None"
+	help
+	  No lockdown functionality is enabled by default. Lockdown may be
+	  enabled via the kernel commandline or /sys/kernel/security/lockdown.
+
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY
+	bool "Integrity"
+	help
+	 The kernel runs in integrity mode by default. Features that allow
+	 the kernel to be modified at runtime are disabled.
+
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY
+	bool "Confidentiality"
+	help
+	 The kernel runs in confidentiality mode by default. Features that
+	 allow the kernel to be modified at runtime or that permit userland
+	 code to read confidential material held inside the kernel are
+	 disabled.
+
+endchoice