Merge tag 'i3c/for-7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/i3c/linuxgrafted

Pull I3C updates from Alexandre Belloni:
 "A new driver this cycle, for the AMD AXI I3C controller.

  There are also new features such as IBI wakeup support, SETAASA device
  discovery and ACPI support for the the DAA methods, meaning we can now
  communicate with the SPD devices on DDR5 modules.

  New driver:
   - AMD AXI I3C master controller

  Subsystem:
   - I3C Common Command Code (CCC) handling improvements, especially
     around GET CCCs
   - SETAASA device discovery support
   - ACPI support for all existing DAA methods like SETDASA, SETNEWDA as
     well as I2C devices on I3C bus
   - IBI-based wakeup support

  Drivers:
   - dw: SETAASA support
   - mipi-i3c-hci: advertise IBI wakeup capability, AMD_PT I3C
     controller support, PIO queue management support for HCI v1.2
   - renesas: improve suspend to RAM support, add runtime PM support"

* tag 'i3c/for-7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/i3c/linux: (70 commits)
  i3c: dw: reduce do_daa time if there's no client
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Add support for AMD_PT I3C controller
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Add PIO queue management support for HCI v1.2
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Fix missing STAT_IBI_STATUS_THLD in PIO mode
  i3c: dw: rename "pclk" to "apb" to match dt-binding
  i3c: dw: make struct dw_i3c_cmd smaller
  i3c: dw: use COMMAND_PORT_TRANSFER_ARG instead of hardcoding
  i3c: renesas: Don't register devices when ENTDAA times out
  i3c: master: dw-i3c-master: fix OD timing for first broadcast
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Advertise IBI wakeup capability
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Factor out i3c_hci_sysdev()
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci-pci: Propagate I3C wakeup requirements to PCI
  i3c: master: Reject IBI requests from non-IBI-capable devices
  i3c: master: Add helper to query bus wakeup requirements
  i3c: master: Report wakeup events for IBIs
  i3c: master: Support IBI-based wakeup capability
  i3c: master: Fix potential UAF in i3c_device_match()
  i3c: master: Fix potential UAF in i3c_device_uevent()
  i3c: Make dev->desc locking assumptions explicit
  i3c: master: Fix use-after-free of master->this
  ...

1 files changed, 185 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/landlock/trace.c b/security/landlock/trace.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ea7aac8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/trace.c
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - Tracepoint helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ * Copyright © 2026 Cloudflare, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "access.h"
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+
+/*
+ * Generates the tracepoint definitions in this translation unit.  The trace
+ * event header dereferences the traced objects in TP_fast_assign, so the full
+ * struct definitions (e.g. ruleset.h, domain.h) must be included before it.
+ */
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/landlock.h>
+
+/**
+ * landlock_trace_free_domain - Emit a tracepoint on domain deallocation
+ *
+ * @hierarchy: The domain's hierarchy being deallocated.
+ *
+ * Fires only for a hierarchy whose creation event was emitted, i.e. one that
+ * left LANDLOCK_LOG_UNCOMMITTED in landlock_restrict_self().  This keeps the
+ * create/free pair balanced: a hierarchy that never became observable is freed
+ * silently, while a domain that landlock_restrict_self() created and a
+ * thread-sync failure then aborted still fires free_domain, because its
+ * creation event already fired.
+ *
+ * Called from landlock_log_free_domain().
+ */
+void landlock_trace_free_domain(const struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The log_status read is a correctness guard (keep the create/free pair
+	 * balanced), not a cost guard, so this cold path needs no
+	 * trace_..._enabled() check: the tracepoint is a static-branch no-op
+	 * when disabled.  The denial path guards trace_..._enabled() instead
+	 * because it does expensive __getname()/path work before emitting.
+	 */
+	if (READ_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status) != LANDLOCK_LOG_UNCOMMITTED)
+		trace_landlock_free_domain(hierarchy);
+}
+
+/**
+ * landlock_trace_denial - Emit a tracepoint for a denied access request
+ *
+ * @request: Detail of the user space request.
+ * @youngest_denied: The youngest hierarchy node that denied the access.
+ * @missing: The set of denied access rights.
+ * @same_exec: Whether the current task is the same executable that called
+ *             landlock_restrict_self() for the denying domain, as computed
+ *             by landlock_log_denial().
+ * @logged: Whether the domain's policy selects this denial for logging, as
+ *          computed by landlock_log_denial().
+ *
+ * Emits the tracepoint matching @request->type when its event is enabled.
+ * Unlike audit, fires regardless of @logged; the value is recorded in the event
+ * so consumers can filter on it.
+ *
+ * Called from landlock_log_denial().
+ */
+void landlock_trace_denial(
+	const struct landlock_request *const request,
+	const struct landlock_hierarchy *const youngest_denied,
+	const access_mask_t missing, const bool same_exec, const bool logged)
+{
+	switch (request->type) {
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS:
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY:
+		if (trace_landlock_deny_access_fs_enabled()) {
+			char *buf __free(__putname) = __getname();
+			struct path dentry_path;
+			const char *pathname;
+			const struct path *path = NULL;
+
+			/*
+			 * Selects the path from the audit data type, as
+			 * dump_common_audit_data() does.  A FS_ACCESS denial
+			 * carries a file (hook_file_truncate) or an ioctl op
+			 * (hook_file_ioctl) rather than a path;
+			 * FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY carries a path or a bare dentry.
+			 * Reading the wrong union member would dereference
+			 * garbage, so every reachable type is handled here.
+			 */
+			switch (request->audit.type) {
+			case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE:
+				path = &request->audit.u.file->f_path;
+				break;
+			case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP:
+				path = &request->audit.u.op->path;
+				break;
+			case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY:
+				/*
+				 * Build a path on the stack with the real
+				 * dentry so TP_fast_assign can extract dev and
+				 * ino; the mnt field is unused there.
+				 */
+				dentry_path = (struct path){
+					.dentry = request->audit.u.dentry,
+				};
+				path = &dentry_path;
+				break;
+			case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH:
+				path = &request->audit.u.path;
+				break;
+			default:
+				WARN_ONCE(1,
+					  "Unhandled Landlock FS audit type %d",
+					  request->audit.type);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (!path)
+				break;
+
+			if (!buf) {
+				pathname = "<no_mem>";
+			} else if (request->audit.type ==
+				   LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY) {
+				/* No vfsmount: render the dentry path alone. */
+				pathname = dentry_path_raw(
+					request->audit.u.dentry, buf, PATH_MAX);
+				if (IS_ERR(pathname))
+					pathname =
+						PTR_ERR(pathname) ==
+								-ENAMETOOLONG ?
+							"<too_long>" :
+							"<unreachable>";
+			} else {
+				pathname = resolve_path_for_trace(path, buf);
+			}
+
+			trace_landlock_deny_access_fs(youngest_denied,
+						      same_exec, logged,
+						      missing, path, pathname);
+		}
+		break;
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS:
+		if (trace_landlock_deny_access_net_enabled())
+			trace_landlock_deny_access_net(
+				youngest_denied, same_exec, logged, missing,
+				request->audit.u.net->sk,
+				ntohs(request->audit.u.net->sport),
+				ntohs(request->audit.u.net->dport));
+		break;
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE:
+		if (trace_landlock_deny_ptrace_enabled())
+			trace_landlock_deny_ptrace(youngest_denied, same_exec,
+						   logged,
+						   request->other_domain_id,
+						   request->audit.u.tsk);
+		break;
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL:
+		if (trace_landlock_deny_scope_signal_enabled())
+			trace_landlock_deny_scope_signal(
+				youngest_denied, same_exec, logged,
+				request->other_domain_id, request->audit.u.tsk);
+		break;
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET:
+		if (trace_landlock_deny_scope_abstract_unix_socket_enabled())
+			trace_landlock_deny_scope_abstract_unix_socket(
+				youngest_denied, same_exec, logged,
+				request->other_domain_id,
+				request->audit.u.net->sk);
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Unhandled Landlock request type %d",
+			  request->type);
+		break;
+	}
+}