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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /security/landlock/setup.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/landlock/setup.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/setup.c | 81 |
1 files changed, 81 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..47dac1736 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - Security framework setup + * + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#include <linux/bits.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> +#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> + +#include "common.h" +#include "cred.h" +#include "errata.h" +#include "fs.h" +#include "id.h" +#include "net.h" +#include "setup.h" +#include "task.h" + +bool landlock_initialized __ro_after_init = false; + +const struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid = { + .name = LANDLOCK_NAME, + .id = LSM_ID_LANDLOCK, +}; + +struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { + .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security), + .lbs_file = sizeof(struct landlock_file_security), + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security), + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security), +}; + +int landlock_errata __ro_after_init; + +static void __init compute_errata(void) +{ + size_t i; + +#ifndef __has_include + /* + * This is a safeguard to make sure the compiler implements + * __has_include (see errata.h). + */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return; +#endif + + for (i = 0; landlock_errata_init[i].number; i++) { + const int prev_errata = landlock_errata; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_errata_init[i].abi > + landlock_abi_version)) + continue; + + landlock_errata |= BIT(landlock_errata_init[i].number - 1); + WARN_ON_ONCE(prev_errata == landlock_errata); + } +} + +static int __init landlock_init(void) +{ + compute_errata(); + landlock_add_cred_hooks(); + landlock_add_task_hooks(); + landlock_add_fs_hooks(); + landlock_add_net_hooks(); + landlock_init_id(); + landlock_initialized = true; + pr_info("Up and running.\n"); + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(LANDLOCK_NAME) = { + .id = &landlock_lsmid, + .init = landlock_init, + .blobs = &landlock_blob_sizes, +}; |
