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authorMiguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>2026-08-16 15:32:33 +0200
committerMiguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>2026-08-23 21:27:17 +0200
commit5febf432df1cfa5b25d99b54c32103fafbdd0eb9 (patch)
tree93a1ed1d337bc53adf1e572c2586d347703b286e /security/landlock/id.c
downloadlinux-stable-5febf432df1cfa5b25d99b54c32103fafbdd0eb9.tar.gz
linux-stable-5febf432df1cfa5b25d99b54c32103fafbdd0eb9.zip
kbuild: rust: keep Rust objects out of Clang LTO with inline helpersgrafted
Under `CONFIG_LTO_CLANG` + `CONFIG_RUST_INLINE_HELPERS`, one may hit `objtool` errors such as: vmlinux.o: error: objtool: _R..._3Gsp4boot+0xd6a: can't find jump dest instruction at .text._R..._3Gsp4boot+0x1dfd The reason is that in such builds, the Clang invocation that compiles the combined Rust plus helpers bitcode emits LLVM bitcode (again) -- the final code generation happens in the linker's LTO step, which the `-mllvm` trap options passed to Clang do not reach. This, in turn, means that unreachable traps are missing, and the impossible paths do not merely fallthrough to the next symbol, but past the end of their own section, since LTO builds place each function in its own section. Thus filter `CC_FLAGS_LTO` out of the Clang invocation, so that it always emits machine code directly, with the traps in place. Assisted-by: LLM Cc: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun@kernel.org> Cc: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com> Cc: Matthew Maurer <mmaurer@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3a2486cc1da5 ("kbuild: rust: provide an option to inline C helpers into Rust") Acked-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260816133233.197500-2-ojeda@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/landlock/id.c')
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/id.c295
1 files changed, 295 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/landlock/id.c b/security/landlock/id.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6c8769777
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/id.c
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock - Unique identification number generator
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "id.h"
+
+#define COUNTER_PRE_INIT 0
+
+static atomic64_t next_id = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+static void __init init_id(atomic64_t *const counter, const u32 random_32bits)
+{
+ u64 init;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensures sure 64-bit values are always used by user space (or may
+ * fail with -EOVERFLOW), and makes this testable.
+ */
+ init = BIT_ULL(32);
+
+ /*
+ * Makes a large (2^32) boot-time value to limit ID collision in logs
+ * from different boots, and to limit info leak about the number of
+ * initially (relative to the reader) created elements (e.g. domains).
+ */
+ init += random_32bits;
+
+ /* Sets first or ignores. This will be the first ID. */
+ atomic64_cmpxchg(counter, COUNTER_PRE_INIT, init);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void __init test_init_min(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+ init_id(&counter, 0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), 1ULL + U32_MAX);
+}
+
+static void __init test_init_max(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+ init_id(&counter, ~0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), 1 + (2ULL * U32_MAX));
+}
+
+static void __init test_init_once(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ const u64 first_init = 1ULL + U32_MAX;
+ atomic64_t counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+ init_id(&counter, 0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), first_init);
+
+ init_id(&counter, ~0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(
+ test, atomic64_read(&counter), first_init,
+ "Should still have the same value after the subsequent init_id()");
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+void __init landlock_init_id(void)
+{
+ return init_id(&next_id, get_random_u32());
+}
+
+/*
+ * It's not worth it to try to hide the monotonic counter because it can still
+ * be inferred (with N counter ranges), and if we are allowed to read the inode
+ * number we should also be allowed to read the time creation anyway, and it
+ * can be handy to store and sort domain IDs for user space.
+ *
+ * Returns the value of next_id and increment it to let some space for the next
+ * one.
+ */
+static u64 get_id_range(size_t number_of_ids, atomic64_t *const counter,
+ u8 random_4bits)
+{
+ u64 id, step;
+
+ /*
+ * We should return at least 1 ID, and we may need a set of consecutive
+ * ones (e.g. to generate a set of inodes).
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(number_of_ids <= 0))
+ number_of_ids = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Blurs the next ID guess with 1/16 ratio. We get 2^(64 - 4) -
+ * (2 * 2^32), so a bit less than 2^60 available IDs, which should be
+ * much more than enough considering the number of CPU cycles required
+ * to get a new ID (e.g. a full landlock_restrict_self() call), and the
+ * cost of draining all available IDs during the system's uptime.
+ */
+ random_4bits &= 0b1111;
+ step = number_of_ids + random_4bits;
+
+ /* It is safe to cast a signed atomic to an unsigned value. */
+ id = atomic64_fetch_add(step, counter);
+
+ /* Warns if landlock_init_id() was not called. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(id == COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+ return id;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static u8 get_random_u8_positive(void)
+{
+ /* max() evaluates its arguments once. */
+ return max(1, get_random_u8());
+}
+
+static void test_range1_rand0(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 0), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+ get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+ get_random_u8()),
+ init + 1);
+}
+
+static void test_range1_rand1(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 1), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+ get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+ get_random_u8()),
+ init + 2);
+}
+
+static void test_range1_rand15(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 15), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+ get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+ get_random_u8()),
+ init + 16);
+}
+
+static void test_range1_rand16(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 16), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+ get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+ get_random_u8()),
+ init + 1);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand0(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 0), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+ get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+ get_random_u8()),
+ init + 2);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand1(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 1), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+ get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+ get_random_u8()),
+ init + 3);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand2(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 2), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+ get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+ get_random_u8()),
+ init + 4);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand15(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 15), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+ get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+ get_random_u8()),
+ init + 17);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand16(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 16), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
+ get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter,
+ get_random_u8()),
+ init + 2);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+/**
+ * landlock_get_id_range - Get a range of unique IDs
+ *
+ * @number_of_ids: Number of IDs to hold. Must be greater than one.
+ *
+ * Return: The first ID in the range.
+ */
+u64 landlock_get_id_range(size_t number_of_ids)
+{
+ return get_id_range(number_of_ids, &next_id, get_random_u8());
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static struct kunit_case __refdata test_cases[] = {
+ /* clang-format off */
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_init_min),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_init_max),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_init_once),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand0),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand1),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand15),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand16),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand0),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand1),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand2),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand15),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand16),
+ {}
+ /* clang-format on */
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite test_suite = {
+ .name = "landlock_id",
+ .test_cases = test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_init_section_suite(test_suite);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */