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authorXie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>2026-07-28 03:16:42 +0100
committerRussell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>2026-08-05 16:15:51 +0100
commit1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66 (patch)
treee8ee4ac80f87e2ad1b6b0c877eccbb62b0915c02 /security/keys/compat.c
downloadlinux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.tar.gz
linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.zip
ARM: 9485/1: mm: acquire mmap write lock around show_pte() for user faultsgrafted
When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y, and cmdline "user_debug=31" is set, a user fault may trigger show_pte() without any lock. If another thread in the same process concurrently calls munmap(), the page table pages may be freed while show_pte() is still traversing them, causing a use-after-free in show_pte(). If CONFIG_ARM_LPAE=y, this may cause a kernel panic if the pages table of PMD are freed when show_pte() is running. Acquire mmap_write_lock() around show_pte() for user faults to fix the contention. For user faults, additionally restrict that show_pte() is called only when the addr is a user-space address (addr < TASK_SIZE). This is because the lock of tsk->mm only protects the virtual memory of user address space, furthermore, dumping the page tables of a kernel-space address for user faults is unnecessary and may have security implications. Keep everything unchanged for kernel faults, because the kernel is already in the "oops" state, acquiring a lock may risk a deadlock. Co-developed-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com> Fixes: 6d021b724481 ("ARM: dump pgd, pmd and pte states on unhandled data abort faults") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260716014022.2823-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys/compat.c')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat.c132
1 files changed, 132 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1545efdca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* 32-bit compatibility syscall for 64-bit systems
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs
+ */
+COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
+ u32, arg2, u32, arg3, u32, arg4, u32, arg5)
+{
+ switch (option) {
+ case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID:
+ return keyctl_get_keyring_ID(arg2, arg3);
+
+ case KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING:
+ return keyctl_join_session_keyring(compat_ptr(arg2));
+
+ case KEYCTL_UPDATE:
+ return keyctl_update_key(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
+
+ case KEYCTL_REVOKE:
+ return keyctl_revoke_key(arg2);
+
+ case KEYCTL_DESCRIBE:
+ return keyctl_describe_key(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
+
+ case KEYCTL_CLEAR:
+ return keyctl_keyring_clear(arg2);
+
+ case KEYCTL_LINK:
+ return keyctl_keyring_link(arg2, arg3);
+
+ case KEYCTL_UNLINK:
+ return keyctl_keyring_unlink(arg2, arg3);
+
+ case KEYCTL_SEARCH:
+ return keyctl_keyring_search(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3),
+ compat_ptr(arg4), arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_READ:
+ return keyctl_read_key(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
+
+ case KEYCTL_CHOWN:
+ return keyctl_chown_key(arg2, arg3, arg4);
+
+ case KEYCTL_SETPERM:
+ return keyctl_setperm_key(arg2, arg3);
+
+ case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE:
+ return keyctl_instantiate_key(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4,
+ arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_NEGATE:
+ return keyctl_negate_key(arg2, arg3, arg4);
+
+ case KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING:
+ return keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(arg2);
+
+ case KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT:
+ return keyctl_set_timeout(arg2, arg3);
+
+ case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
+ return keyctl_assume_authority(arg2);
+
+ case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
+ return keyctl_get_security(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
+
+ case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+ return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
+ case KEYCTL_REJECT:
+ return keyctl_reject_key(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
+ return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4,
+ arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
+ return keyctl_invalidate_key(arg2);
+
+ case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
+ return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3);
+
+ case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
+ return compat_keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2),
+ compat_ptr(arg3),
+ arg4, compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+ case KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
+ return keyctl_restrict_keyring(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3),
+ compat_ptr(arg4));
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY:
+ if (arg3 != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return keyctl_pkey_query(arg2,
+ compat_ptr(arg4),
+ compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+ return keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(option,
+ compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
+ compat_ptr(arg4), compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
+ return keyctl_pkey_verify(compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
+ compat_ptr(arg4), compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+ case KEYCTL_MOVE:
+ return keyctl_keyring_move(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_CAPABILITIES:
+ return keyctl_capabilities(compat_ptr(arg2), arg3);
+
+ case KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY:
+ return keyctl_watch_key(arg2, arg3, arg4);
+
+ default:
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+}