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| author | Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com> | 2026-07-28 03:16:42 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> | 2026-08-05 16:15:51 +0100 |
| commit | 1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66 (patch) | |
| tree | e8ee4ac80f87e2ad1b6b0c877eccbb62b0915c02 /security/ipe/ipe.c | |
| download | linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.tar.gz linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.zip | |
ARM: 9485/1: mm: acquire mmap write lock around show_pte() for user faultsgrafted
When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y, and cmdline "user_debug=31" is set,
a user fault may trigger show_pte() without any lock.
If another thread in the same process concurrently calls munmap(),
the page table pages may be freed while show_pte() is still traversing
them, causing a use-after-free in show_pte().
If CONFIG_ARM_LPAE=y, this may cause a kernel panic if the pages table
of PMD are freed when show_pte() is running.
Acquire mmap_write_lock() around show_pte() for user faults to fix the
contention.
For user faults, additionally restrict that show_pte() is called only
when the addr is a user-space address (addr < TASK_SIZE). This is because
the lock of tsk->mm only protects the virtual memory of user address space,
furthermore, dumping the page tables of a kernel-space address for user
faults is unnecessary and may have security implications.
Keep everything unchanged for kernel faults, because the kernel is
already in the "oops" state, acquiring a lock may risk a deadlock.
Co-developed-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6d021b724481 ("ARM: dump pgd, pmd and pte states on unhandled data abort faults")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260716014022.2823-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/ipe/ipe.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/ipe/ipe.c | 100 |
1 files changed, 100 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..495bb765d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "eval.h" +#include "hooks.h" + +extern const char *const ipe_boot_policy; +bool ipe_enabled; + +static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = { + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct ipe_superblock), +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + .lbs_bdev = sizeof(struct ipe_bdev), +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct ipe_inode), +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */ +}; + +static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = { + .name = "ipe", + .id = LSM_ID_IPE, +}; + +struct ipe_superblock *ipe_sb(const struct super_block *sb) +{ + return sb->s_security + ipe_blobs.lbs_superblock; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b) +{ + return b->bd_security + ipe_blobs.lbs_bdev; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG +struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode(const struct inode *inode) +{ + return inode->i_security + ipe_blobs.lbs_inode; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */ + +static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_bprm_check_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, ipe_bprm_creds_for_exec), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_mmap_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ipe_file_mprotect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_kernel_read_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_kernel_load_data), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(initramfs_populated, ipe_unpack_initramfs), +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_free_security, ipe_bdev_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_setintegrity, ipe_bdev_setintegrity), +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setintegrity, ipe_inode_setintegrity), +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */ +}; + +/** + * ipe_init() - Entry point of IPE. + * + * This is called at LSM init, which happens occurs early during kernel + * start up. During this phase, IPE registers its hooks and loads the + * builtin boot policy. + * + * Return: + * * %0 - OK + * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory (OOM) + */ +static int __init ipe_init(void) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), &ipe_lsmid); + ipe_enabled = true; + + if (ipe_boot_policy) { + p = ipe_new_policy(ipe_boot_policy, strlen(ipe_boot_policy), + NULL, 0); + if (IS_ERR(p)) + return PTR_ERR(p); + + rcu_assign_pointer(ipe_active_policy, p); + } + + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = { + .id = &ipe_lsmid, + .init = ipe_init, + .blobs = &ipe_blobs, + .initcall_fs = ipe_init_securityfs, +}; |
