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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /security/ipe/fs.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/ipe/fs.c')
-rw-r--r--security/ipe/fs.c246
1 files changed, 246 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..076c111c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/ipe/fs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+#include "ipe.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "eval.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
+static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init;
+struct dentry *policy_root __ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * setaudit() - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit"
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written - Success
+ * * %-EPERM - Insufficient permission
+ */
+static ssize_t setaudit(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
+ size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ bool value;
+
+ if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(success_audit, value);
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * getaudit() - Read handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit"
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the read syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return: Length of buffer written
+ */
+static ssize_t getaudit(struct file *f, char __user *data,
+ size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+ const char *result;
+
+ result = ((READ_ONCE(success_audit)) ? "1" : "0");
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * setenforce() - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce"
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written - Success
+ * * %-EPERM - Insufficient permission
+ */
+static ssize_t setenforce(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
+ size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ bool new_value, old_value;
+
+ if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ old_value = READ_ONCE(enforce);
+ rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &new_value);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (new_value != old_value) {
+ ipe_audit_enforce(new_value, old_value);
+ WRITE_ONCE(enforce, new_value);
+ }
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * getenforce() - Read handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce"
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the read syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return: Length of buffer written
+ */
+static ssize_t getenforce(struct file *f, char __user *data,
+ size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+ const char *result;
+
+ result = ((READ_ONCE(enforce)) ? "1" : "0");
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * new_policy() - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/new_policy".
+ * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
+ * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
+ * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
+ * @offset: unused.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Length of buffer written - Success
+ * * %-EPERM - Insufficient permission
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory (OOM)
+ * * %-EBADMSG - Policy is invalid
+ * * %-ERANGE - Policy version number overflow
+ * * %-EINVAL - Policy version parsing error
+ * * %-EEXIST - Same name policy already deployed
+ * * %-ENOKEY - Policy signing key not found
+ * * %-EKEYREJECTED - Policy signature verification failed
+ */
+static ssize_t new_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
+ size_t len, loff_t *offset)
+{
+ struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
+ char *copy = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ copy = memdup_user_nul(data, len);
+ if (IS_ERR(copy)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(copy);
+ copy = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ p = ipe_new_policy(NULL, 0, copy, len);
+ if (IS_ERR(p)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = ipe_new_policyfs_node(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+out:
+ kfree(copy);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ ipe_free_policy(p);
+ ipe_audit_policy_load(ERR_PTR(rc));
+ } else {
+ ipe_audit_policy_load(p);
+ }
+ return (rc < 0) ? rc : len;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations np_fops = {
+ .write = new_policy,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations audit_fops = {
+ .write = setaudit,
+ .read = getaudit,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations enforce_fops = {
+ .write = setenforce,
+ .read = getenforce,
+};
+
+/**
+ * ipe_init_securityfs() - Initialize IPE's securityfs tree at fsinit.
+ *
+ * Return: %0 on success. If an error occurs, the function will return
+ * the -errno.
+ */
+int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ipe_policy *ap;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+
+ if (!ipe_enabled)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ root = securityfs_create_dir("ipe", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(root))
+ return PTR_ERR(root);
+
+ dentry = securityfs_create_file("success_audit", 0600, root,
+ NULL, &audit_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ dentry = securityfs_create_file("enforce", 0600, root, NULL,
+ &enforce_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ policy_root = securityfs_create_dir("policies", root);
+ if (IS_ERR(policy_root)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(policy_root);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ap = rcu_access_pointer(ipe_active_policy);
+ if (ap) {
+ rc = ipe_new_policyfs_node(ap);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ dentry = securityfs_create_file("new_policy", 0200, root, NULL, &np_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ securityfs_remove(root);
+ return rc;
+}