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| author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2026-10-01 14:52:55 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> | 2026-10-01 18:39:27 +0200 |
| commit | 33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4 (patch) | |
| tree | 543be8029ab3d8a3a63994ae23385a053ed30029 /security/ipe/eval.h | |
| download | linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.tar.gz linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.zip | |
selftests/bpf: Test packet range of pointers sharing an idgrafted
Add tests where two packet pointers share an id and tightening one
pointer's umax from its var_off would put it less than their constant
distance from the other's umax: with an index & 0x38 capped at 50, the
base pointer keeps umax 50, so the pointer 8 bytes further on must keep
umax 58, even though its known bits allow at most 56.
These refused a valid program or accepted an out-of-bounds access before
the fix:
- check the advanced copy, load through the base: valid, was refused;
- check the base, load the byte at base + 1 through a copy advanced by
8: was accepted;
- check base + 4, load 4 bytes at base + 2 through base + 8: reads two
bytes past the checked range, was accepted;
- the same as the second with data_meta pointers checked against data:
was accepted.
These pass with and without the fix and cover nearby paths:
- subtract an unknown scalar from a checked pointer and load below it
(the range is kept across a new id);
- reach a load through two paths whose checks cover 8 and 7 bytes after
the loaded pointer; the second path must not be pruned by the first;
- spill a copy of a pointer, check the pointer, fill the copy and load
one byte past the checked range: the load is refused, and the copy
has the range of the check.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20261001145255.855630-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/ipe/eval.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/ipe/eval.h | 70 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fef65a364 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _IPE_EVAL_H +#define _IPE_EVAL_H + +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#include "policy.h" +#include "hooks.h" + +#define IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT ((struct ipe_eval_ctx){ 0 }) + +extern struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; +extern bool success_audit; +extern bool enforce; + +struct ipe_superblock { + bool initramfs; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +struct ipe_bdev { +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE + bool dm_verity_signed; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE */ + struct digest_info *root_hash; +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG +struct ipe_inode { + bool fs_verity_signed; +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */ + +struct ipe_eval_ctx { + enum ipe_op_type op; + enum ipe_hook_type hook; + + const struct file *file; + bool initramfs; +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + const struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY + const struct inode *ino; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG + const struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */ +}; + +enum ipe_match { + IPE_MATCH_RULE = 0, + IPE_MATCH_TABLE, + IPE_MATCH_GLOBAL, + __IPE_MATCH_MAX +}; + +void ipe_build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, + const struct file *file, + enum ipe_op_type op, + enum ipe_hook_type hook); +int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx); + +#endif /* _IPE_EVAL_H */ |
