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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /security/integrity/iint.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/iint.c')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c71
1 files changed, 71 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ec1a3436
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: integrity_iint.c
+ * - initialize the integrity directory in securityfs
+ * - load IMA and EVM keys
+ */
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "integrity.h"
+
+struct dentry *integrity_dir;
+
+/*
+ * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
+ *
+ * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
+ * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
+ * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
+ *
+ */
+int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+ void *addr, unsigned long count)
+{
+ return __kernel_read(file, addr, count, &offset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * integrity_load_keys - load integrity keys hook
+ *
+ * Hooks is called from init/main.c:kernel_init_freeable()
+ * when rootfs is ready
+ */
+void __init integrity_load_keys(void)
+{
+ ima_load_x509();
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509))
+ evm_load_x509();
+}
+
+int __init integrity_fs_init(void)
+{
+ if (integrity_dir)
+ return 0;
+
+ integrity_dir = securityfs_create_dir("integrity", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(integrity_dir)) {
+ int ret = PTR_ERR(integrity_dir);
+
+ if (ret != -ENODEV)
+ pr_err("Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: %d\n",
+ ret);
+ integrity_dir = NULL;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void __init integrity_fs_fini(void)
+{
+ if (!integrity_dir || !simple_empty(integrity_dir))
+ return;
+
+ securityfs_remove(integrity_dir);
+ integrity_dir = NULL;
+}