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authorSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>2026-09-23 09:37:21 -0700
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2026-09-26 00:39:55 -0400
commit93de2a6a4b91b72607136dd656edf03fb399d27f (patch)
tree9220c76eb23cb39a146fac9692ee69afa4aa3135 /security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
downloadlinux-stable-93de2a6a4b91b72607136dd656edf03fb399d27f.tar.gz
linux-stable-93de2a6a4b91b72607136dd656edf03fb399d27f.zip
KVM: SEV: Do cache maintenance on the source VM during intra-host migrationgrafted
Manually perform cache maintenance on the source VM during intra-host migration to ensure no stale data is left in CPU caches after the VM is destroyed. Because the source VM is "converted" to a non-SEV VM, KVM's memory reclaim flows won't trigger cache maintenance, e.g. when all guest memory is reclaimed in response to detaching from the mmu_notifier. Note, relying on the destination VM to do cache maintenance isn't an option as KVM doesn't require identical guest memory configurations, i.e. the source VM may have access to memory that the destination VM does not. Enforcing equivalent memory configurations is infeasible, as it would require a *deep* comparison of memslots, e.g. to verify that not only are the memslot identical, but what the memslots point at is also identical. Fixes: b56639318bb2 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Stefan Teodorescu <fane@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-ID: <20260923163721.1584779-3-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c56
1 files changed, 56 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c b/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bfd4260a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-1.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+#ifndef arch_efi_boot_mode
+#define arch_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset
+#endif
+
+static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
+{
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
+
+ if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+ }
+
+ mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
+ if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled)
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode disabled\n");
+ else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown)
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode enabled\n");
+ return mode;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Query secure boot status
+ *
+ * Note don't call this function too early e.g. in __setup hook otherwise the
+ * kernel may hang when calling efi_get_secureboot_mode.
+ *
+ */
+bool arch_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
+ static bool initialized;
+
+ if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ sb_mode = arch_efi_boot_mode;
+
+ if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
+ sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
+ initialized = true;
+ }
+
+ if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+ return true;
+ else
+ return false;
+}