Merge tag 'i3c/for-7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/i3c/linuxgrafted

Pull I3C updates from Alexandre Belloni:
 "A new driver this cycle, for the AMD AXI I3C controller.

  There are also new features such as IBI wakeup support, SETAASA device
  discovery and ACPI support for the the DAA methods, meaning we can now
  communicate with the SPD devices on DDR5 modules.

  New driver:
   - AMD AXI I3C master controller

  Subsystem:
   - I3C Common Command Code (CCC) handling improvements, especially
     around GET CCCs
   - SETAASA device discovery support
   - ACPI support for all existing DAA methods like SETDASA, SETNEWDA as
     well as I2C devices on I3C bus
   - IBI-based wakeup support

  Drivers:
   - dw: SETAASA support
   - mipi-i3c-hci: advertise IBI wakeup capability, AMD_PT I3C
     controller support, PIO queue management support for HCI v1.2
   - renesas: improve suspend to RAM support, add runtime PM support"

* tag 'i3c/for-7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/i3c/linux: (70 commits)
  i3c: dw: reduce do_daa time if there's no client
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Add support for AMD_PT I3C controller
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Add PIO queue management support for HCI v1.2
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Fix missing STAT_IBI_STATUS_THLD in PIO mode
  i3c: dw: rename "pclk" to "apb" to match dt-binding
  i3c: dw: make struct dw_i3c_cmd smaller
  i3c: dw: use COMMAND_PORT_TRANSFER_ARG instead of hardcoding
  i3c: renesas: Don't register devices when ENTDAA times out
  i3c: master: dw-i3c-master: fix OD timing for first broadcast
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Advertise IBI wakeup capability
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Factor out i3c_hci_sysdev()
  i3c: mipi-i3c-hci-pci: Propagate I3C wakeup requirements to PCI
  i3c: master: Reject IBI requests from non-IBI-capable devices
  i3c: master: Add helper to query bus wakeup requirements
  i3c: master: Report wakeup events for IBIs
  i3c: master: Support IBI-based wakeup capability
  i3c: master: Fix potential UAF in i3c_device_match()
  i3c: master: Fix potential UAF in i3c_device_uevent()
  i3c: Make dev->desc locking assumptions explicit
  i3c: master: Fix use-after-free of master->this
  ...

1 files changed, 228 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ed686154
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/digsig.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+
+#include "integrity.h"
+
+static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
+
+static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
+#ifndef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	"_evm",
+	"_ima",
+#else
+	".evm",
+	".ima",
+#endif
+	".platform",
+	".machine",
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
+#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary
+#else
+#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin
+#endif
+
+static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	if (!keyring[id]) {
+		keyring[id] =
+			request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
+		if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
+			int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
+			pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
+			keyring[id] = NULL;
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return keyring[id];
+}
+
+int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
+			    const char *digest, int digestlen, u8 algo)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+
+	if (siglen < 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+		return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+	switch (sig[1]) {
+	case 1:
+		/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
+		return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
+				     digestlen);
+	case 2: /* regular file data hash based signature */
+		return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
+					    digestlen);
+	case 3: /* struct ima_file_id data based signature */
+		return asymmetric_verify_v3(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
+					    digestlen, algo);
+	}
+
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+int integrity_modsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+
+	keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+		return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+	return ima_modsig_verify(keyring, modsig);
+}
+
+static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
+					   key_perm_t perm,
+					   struct key_restriction *restriction)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int err = 0;
+
+	keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
+				    KGIDT_INIT(0), cred, perm,
+				    KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, restriction, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
+		pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
+			keyring_name[id], err);
+		keyring[id] = NULL;
+	} else {
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
+			set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && imputed_trust_enabled())
+			set_machine_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA)
+			load_module_cert(keyring[id]);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	struct key_restriction *restriction;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+	int ret;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW
+		| KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH;
+
+	if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM ||
+	    (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE &&
+	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING))) {
+		restriction = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))
+		return 0;
+
+	restriction = kzalloc_obj(struct key_restriction);
+	if (!restriction)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+		restriction->check = restrict_link_by_ca;
+	else
+		restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
+
+	/*
+	 * MOK keys can only be added through a read-only runtime services
+	 * UEFI variable during boot. No additional keys shall be allowed to
+	 * load into the machine keyring following init from userspace.
+	 */
+	if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+		perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
+
+out:
+	ret = __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction);
+	if (ret)
+		kfree(restriction);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
+				    off_t size, key_perm_t perm)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!keyring[id])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1), "asymmetric",
+				   NULL, data, size, perm,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+		if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+			pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
+			  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+		key_ref_put(key);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+
+}
+
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
+{
+	void *data = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+	int rc;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+
+	rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL,
+					READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	size = rc;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
+
+	pr_info("Loading X.509 certificate: %s\n", path);
+	rc = integrity_add_key(id, (const void *)data, size, perm);
+
+	vfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id, const char *source,
+			       const void *data, size_t len, key_perm_t perm)
+{
+	if (!data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	pr_info("Loading X.509 certificate: %s\n", source);
+	return integrity_add_key(id, data, len, perm);
+}