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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /security/integrity/Kconfig
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
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+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+config INTEGRITY
+ bool "Integrity subsystem"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ default y
+ help
+ This option enables the integrity subsystem, which is comprised
+ of a number of different components including the Integrity
+ Measurement Architecture (IMA), Extended Verification Module
+ (EVM), IMA-appraisal extension, digital signature verification
+ extension and audit measurement log support.
+
+ Each of these components can be enabled/disabled separately.
+ Refer to the individual components for additional details.
+
+if INTEGRITY
+
+config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
+ bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings"
+ default n
+ select KEYS
+ select SIGNATURE
+ help
+ This option enables digital signature verification support
+ using multiple keyrings. It defines separate keyrings for each
+ of the different use cases - evm, ima, and modules.
+ Different keyrings improves search performance, but also allow
+ to "lock" certain keyring to prevent adding new keys.
+ This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
+ usually only added from initramfs.
+
+config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ bool "Enable asymmetric keys support"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
+ default n
+ select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+ select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_RSA
+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ help
+ This option enables digital signature verification using
+ asymmetric keys.
+
+config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ bool "Require all keys on the integrity keyrings be signed"
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ default y
+ help
+ This option requires that all keys added to the .ima and
+ .evm keyrings be signed by a key on the system trusted
+ keyring.
+
+config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ bool "Provide keyring for platform/firmware trusted keys"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ help
+ Provide a separate, distinct keyring for platform trusted keys, which
+ the kernel automatically populates during initialization from values
+ provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image
+ and, possibly, the initramfs signature.
+
+config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
+ bool "Provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys may be added"
+ depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+ help
+ If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may
+ be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys. Unlike keys
+ in the platform keyring, keys contained in the .machine keyring will
+ be trusted within the kernel.
+
+config INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING
+ bool "Enforce Machine Keyring CA Restrictions"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
+ default n
+ help
+ The .machine keyring can be configured to enforce CA restriction
+ on any key added to it. By default no restrictions are in place
+ and all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) are added to the machine keyring.
+ If enabled only CA keys are added to the machine keyring, all
+ other MOK keys load into the platform keyring.
+
+config INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX
+ bool "Only CA keys without DigitialSignature usage set"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING
+ default n
+ help
+ When selected, only load CA keys are loaded into the machine
+ keyring that contain the CA bit set along with the keyCertSign
+ Usage field. Keys containing the digitialSignature Usage field
+ will not be loaded. The remaining MOK keys are loaded into the
+ .platform keyring.
+
+config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
+ depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ depends on EFI
+ def_bool y
+
+config LOAD_IPL_KEYS
+ depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ depends on S390
+ def_bool y
+
+config LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+ bool "Enable loading of platform and blacklisted keys for POWER"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable loading of keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
+ hashes to the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms.
+
+config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+ bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
+ depends on AUDIT
+ default y
+ help
+ In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
+ option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which
+ controls the level of integrity auditing messages.
+ 0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default)
+ 1 - additional integrity auditing messages
+
+ Additional informational integrity auditing messages would
+ be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
+ command line.
+
+source "security/integrity/ima/Kconfig"
+source "security/integrity/evm/Kconfig"
+
+endif # if INTEGRITY