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| author | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 09:55:01 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 11:08:21 -0400 |
| commit | 4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 (patch) | |
| tree | 350aa83b47da0b574a814795392b20b0bed83cbc /security/integrity/Kconfig | |
| download | linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.tar.gz linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.zip | |
ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_opsgrafted
There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since
it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls
ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that
if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to
have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other
call.
Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the
ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that
states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex
has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut
having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after
the mute is taken in case of races.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/Kconfig | 137 |
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000..916d4f2bf --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# +config INTEGRITY + bool "Integrity subsystem" + depends on SECURITY + default y + help + This option enables the integrity subsystem, which is comprised + of a number of different components including the Integrity + Measurement Architecture (IMA), Extended Verification Module + (EVM), IMA-appraisal extension, digital signature verification + extension and audit measurement log support. + + Each of these components can be enabled/disabled separately. + Refer to the individual components for additional details. + +if INTEGRITY + +config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE + bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings" + default n + select KEYS + select SIGNATURE + help + This option enables digital signature verification support + using multiple keyrings. It defines separate keyrings for each + of the different use cases - evm, ima, and modules. + Different keyrings improves search performance, but also allow + to "lock" certain keyring to prevent adding new keys. + This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are + usually only added from initramfs. + +config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + bool "Enable asymmetric keys support" + depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE + default n + select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE + select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_RSA + select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER + help + This option enables digital signature verification using + asymmetric keys. + +config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + bool "Require all keys on the integrity keyrings be signed" + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + default y + help + This option requires that all keys added to the .ima and + .evm keyrings be signed by a key on the system trusted + keyring. + +config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + bool "Provide keyring for platform/firmware trusted keys" + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + help + Provide a separate, distinct keyring for platform trusted keys, which + the kernel automatically populates during initialization from values + provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image + and, possibly, the initramfs signature. + +config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING + bool "Provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys may be added" + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS + help + If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may + be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys. Unlike keys + in the platform keyring, keys contained in the .machine keyring will + be trusted within the kernel. + +config INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING + bool "Enforce Machine Keyring CA Restrictions" + depends on INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING + default n + help + The .machine keyring can be configured to enforce CA restriction + on any key added to it. By default no restrictions are in place + and all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) are added to the machine keyring. + If enabled only CA keys are added to the machine keyring, all + other MOK keys load into the platform keyring. + +config INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX + bool "Only CA keys without DigitialSignature usage set" + depends on INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING + default n + help + When selected, only load CA keys are loaded into the machine + keyring that contain the CA bit set along with the keyCertSign + Usage field. Keys containing the digitialSignature Usage field + will not be loaded. The remaining MOK keys are loaded into the + .platform keyring. + +config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + depends on EFI + def_bool y + +config LOAD_IPL_KEYS + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + depends on S390 + def_bool y + +config LOAD_PPC_KEYS + bool "Enable loading of platform and blacklisted keys for POWER" + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT + default y + help + Enable loading of keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted + hashes to the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms. + +config INTEGRITY_AUDIT + bool "Enables integrity auditing support " + depends on AUDIT + default y + help + In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this + option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which + controls the level of integrity auditing messages. + 0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default) + 1 - additional integrity auditing messages + + Additional informational integrity auditing messages would + be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel + command line. + +source "security/integrity/ima/Kconfig" +source "security/integrity/evm/Kconfig" + +endif # if INTEGRITY |
