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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /security/bpf/hooks.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/bpf/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r--security/bpf/hooks.c42
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7b98f5d1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC.
+ */
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+bool bpf_lsm_initialized __ro_after_init;
+
+static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+ #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
+ #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
+ #undef LSM_HOOK
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, bpf_inode_storage_free),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid = {
+ .name = "bpf",
+ .id = LSM_ID_BPF,
+};
+
+static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
+{
+ security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
+ &bpf_lsmid);
+ bpf_lsm_initialized = true;
+ pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes bpf_lsm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct bpf_storage_blob),
+};
+
+DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = {
+ .id = &bpf_lsmid,
+ .init = bpf_lsm_init,
+ .blobs = &bpf_lsm_blob_sizes
+};