Merge tag 'media/v7.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-mediagrafted

Pull media updates from Mauro Carvalho Chehab:

 - v4l2-core: added ISP statistics support and per-block validation

 - v4l2-core: Allow unknown HDR10 white point and luminance

 - New camera sensors: Sony IMX678 and IMX471m, Himax HM1092 IR sensor

 - New codec: Milos: VPU v2.0 codec support

 - isp driver: gained support for Dreamchip RPPX1 ISP framework

 - vsp1 driver: gained support for RZ/T2H and RZ/N2H

 - Novalake driver: gained CVS support for new NVL hardware

 - dvb-core: fix feed leak on failed DMX_ADD_PID

 - several driver fixes, cleanups and minor improvements

* tag 'media/v7.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-media: (308 commits)
  media: ipu-bridge: check all DMI entries when overriding sensor rotation
  media: v4l2-async: avoid deleting unlinked ASC entry on link error
  media: rzg2l-cru: Align bytesperline to hardware DMA stride requirement
  media: intel/ipu6: fix async notifier cleanup leak on parse error
  media: staging/ipu7: fix async notifier UAF on probe error path
  media: amd: isp4: fix self-deadlock in isp4sd_pwron_and_init() error path
  media: amd: isp4: release partial allocations in isp4if_alloc_fw_gpumem()
  media: rcar-isp: Fix VSPX reference leaks
  media: rcar-isp: Release ISPCORE resources
  media: i2c: imx415: Release runtime PM reference on VBLANK error
  media: i2c: imx415: Return test pattern write errors
  media: renesas: vsp1: Declare index variables in for loop statement
  media: renesas: vsp1: Make reset control optional to support platforms without a reset line
  media: dt-bindings: media: renesas,vsp1: Document RZ/T2H and RZ/N2H SoCs
  media: dt-bindings: media: renesas,fcp: Document RZ/T2H and RZ/N2H SoCs
  media: nxp: imx8-isi: Add additional 32-bit RGB format support
  media: nxp: imx8-isi: Add 16-bit raw Bayer format support
  media: nxp: imx8-isi: Implement per-stream reference counting for multiplexed streams
  media: nxp: imx8-isi: Use BIT_ULL() for 64-bit stream masks
  media: nxp: imx8-isi: Correct color map between V4L2 and ISI
  ...

1 files changed, 408 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf590dd08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/secid.h"
+
+#include "net_names.h"
+
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open",		1),
+	{ }
+};
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_networkv9[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_unix",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open",		1),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
+	"unknown",
+	"send",
+	"receive",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"create",
+	"shutdown",
+	"connect",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"setattr",
+	"getattr",
+	"setcred",
+	"getcred",
+
+	"chmod",
+	"chown",
+	"chgrp",
+	"lock",
+
+	"mmap",
+	"mprot",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"accept",
+	"bind",
+	"listen",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"setopt",
+	"getopt",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+};
+
+static void audit_unix_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str,
+			    struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+	int len = unix_addr_len(addrlen);
+
+	if (!addr || len <= 0) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=none", str);
+	} else if (addr->sun_path[0]) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", str);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, addr->sun_path);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"@", str);
+		if (audit_string_contains_control(&addr->sun_path[1], len - 1))
+			audit_log_n_hex(ab, &addr->sun_path[1], len - 1);
+		else
+			audit_log_format(ab, "%.*s", len - 1,
+					 &addr->sun_path[1]);
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+	}
+}
+
+static void audit_unix_sk_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str,
+			       const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	const struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
+
+	if (u && u->addr) {
+		int addrlen;
+		struct sockaddr_un *addr = aa_sunaddr(u, &addrlen);
+
+		audit_unix_addr(ab, str, addr, addrlen);
+	} else {
+		audit_unix_addr(ab, str, NULL, 0);
+
+	}
+}
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+
+	if (address_family_names[ad->common.u.net->family])
+		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
+				 address_family_names[ad->common.u.net->family]);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
+				 ad->common.u.net->family);
+	if (sock_type_names[ad->net.type])
+		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
+				 sock_type_names[ad->net.type]);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
+				 ad->net.type);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", ad->net.protocol);
+
+	if (ad->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
+		aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->request, NULL, 0,
+				   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+
+		if (ad->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
+			aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->denied, NULL, 0,
+					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+		}
+	}
+	if (ad->common.u.net->family == PF_UNIX) {
+		if (ad->net.addr || !ad->common.u.net->sk)
+			audit_unix_addr(ab, "addr",
+					unix_addr(ad->net.addr),
+					ad->net.addrlen);
+		else
+			audit_unix_sk_addr(ab, "addr", ad->common.u.net->sk);
+		if (ad->request & NET_PEER_MASK) {
+			audit_unix_addr(ab, "peer_addr",
+					unix_addr(ad->net.peer.addr),
+					ad->net.peer.addrlen);
+		}
+	}
+	if (ad->peer) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
+				FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	}
+}
+
+/* standard permission lookup pattern - supports early bailout */
+int aa_do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_policydb *policy,
+		aa_state_t state, u32 request,
+		struct aa_perms *p, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!policy);
+
+
+	if (state || !p)
+		p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+	perms = *p;
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
+			      audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+/* only continue match if
+ *   insufficient current perms at current state
+ *   indicates there are more perms in later state
+ * Returns: perms struct if early match
+ */
+static struct aa_perms *early_match(struct aa_policydb *policy,
+				    aa_state_t state, u32 request)
+{
+	struct aa_perms *p;
+
+	p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+	if (((p->allow & request) != request) && (p->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH))
+		return NULL;
+	return p;
+}
+
+static aa_state_t aa_dfa_match_be16(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
+					  u16 data)
+{
+	__be16 buffer = cpu_to_be16(data);
+
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 2);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_match_to_prot - match the af, type, protocol triplet
+ * @policy: policy being matched
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @request: permissions being requested, ignored if @p == NULL
+ * @af: socket address family
+ * @type: socket type
+ * @protocol: socket protocol
+ * @p: output - pointer to permission associated with match
+ * @info: output - pointer to string describing failure
+ *
+ * RETURNS: state match stopped in.
+ *
+ * If @(p) is assigned a value the returned state will be the
+ * corresponding state. Will not set @p on failure or if match completes
+ * only if an early match occurs
+ */
+aa_state_t aa_match_to_prot(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
+			    u32 request, u16 af, int type, int protocol,
+			    struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
+{
+	state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)af);
+	if (!state) {
+		*info = "failed af match";
+		return state;
+	}
+	state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)type);
+	if (state) {
+		if (p)
+			*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
+		if (!p || !*p) {
+			state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)protocol);
+			if (!state)
+				*info = "failed protocol match";
+		}
+	} else {
+		*info = "failed type match";
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/* Generic af perm */
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family,
+		       int type, int protocol)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
+	AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+		return 0;
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_NET(rules);
+	if (!state)
+		return 0;
+	state = aa_match_to_prot(rules->policy, state, request, family, type,
+				 protocol, &p, &ad->info);
+	return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, request, p, ad);
+}
+
+int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, subj_cred, NULL, family, type, protocol);
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &ad, request, family,
+					   type, protocol));
+}
+
+static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
+			    const char *op, u32 request,
+			    struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+
+	if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label) != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) {
+		struct aa_profile *profile;
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, subj_cred, sk);
+
+		ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
+		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			    aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk));
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = aa_label_sk_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sk);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	/* sock && sock->sk can be NULL for sockets being set up or torn down */
+	if (!sock || !sock->sk)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return aa_unix_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, file);
+	return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
+		secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
+				    secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
+				    GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(label))
+		return PTR_ERR(label);
+
+	secmark->secid = label->secid;
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
+			   struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+
+	if (rules->secmark_count == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++) {
+		if (!rules->secmark[i].secid) {
+			ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&rules->secmark[i]);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+		}
+
+		if (rules->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
+		    rules->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
+			if (rules->secmark[i].deny)
+				perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+			else
+				perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+
+			if (rules->secmark[i].audit)
+				perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+		}
+	}
+
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
+			   u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, NULL, sk);
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+				    aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
+						    &ad));
+}
+#endif