perf/x86/intel: Rename DMR offcore_rsp attribute to offmodule_rspgrafted

DMR introduces Offmodule Response events in place of the legacy
Offcore Response events, but it still exposes the inherited
offcore_rsp PMU attribute for programming the corresponding MSR data.

Rename the DMR PMU attribute to offmodule_rsp so the sysfs interface
matches the underlying event name and avoids user & tooling confusion.

Signed-off-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260917015234.981153-12-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com

1 files changed, 709 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4ed7b9136
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -0,0 +1,709 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/mount.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_MOUNT(NAME, OP, CRED)				\
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_MOUNT, OP);\
+	NAME.subj_cred = (CRED)
+
+static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
+	if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
+	if (flags & MS_NODEV)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
+	if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
+	if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
+	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
+	if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
+	if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
+	if (flags & MS_NOSYMFOLLOW)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosymfollow");
+	if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
+	if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
+	if (flags & MS_BIND)
+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
+	if (flags & MS_MOVE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
+	if (flags & MS_SILENT)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
+	if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
+	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
+				 ", unbindable");
+	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
+				 ", private");
+	if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
+				 ", slave");
+	if (flags & MS_SHARED)
+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
+				 ", shared");
+	if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
+	if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
+	if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
+	if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+
+	if (ad->mnt.type) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.type);
+	}
+	if (ad->mnt.src_name) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.src_name);
+	}
+	if (ad->mnt.trans) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.trans);
+	}
+	if (ad->mnt.flags) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
+		audit_mnt_flags(ab, ad->mnt.flags);
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+	}
+	if (ad->mnt.data) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.data);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
+ * @dfa: dfa to match against
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @flags: mount flags to match against
+ *
+ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
+ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
+ * on the flags.
+ *
+ * Returns: next state after flags match
+ */
+static aa_state_t match_mnt_flags(const struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
+				    unsigned long flags)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
+		if ((1 << i) & flags)
+			state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+static const char * const mnt_info_table[] = {
+	"match succeeded",
+	"failed mntpnt match",
+	"failed srcname match",
+	"failed type match",
+	"failed flags match",
+	"failed data match",
+	"failed perms check"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
+ * index into the mnt_info_table above
+ */
+static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t start,
+			const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
+			const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+			void *data, bool binary, struct aa_perms *perms)
+{
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!policy);
+	AA_BUG(!policy->dfa);
+	AA_BUG(!policy->perms);
+	AA_BUG(!perms);
+
+	state = aa_dfa_match(policy->dfa, start, mntpnt);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
+	if (!state)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (devname)
+		state = aa_dfa_match(policy->dfa, state, devname);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
+	if (!state)
+		return 2;
+
+	if (type)
+		state = aa_dfa_match(policy->dfa, state, type);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
+	if (!state)
+		return 3;
+
+	state = match_mnt_flags(policy->dfa, state, flags);
+	if (!state)
+		return 4;
+	*perms = *aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+	if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
+	if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_MNT_CONT_MATCH)) {
+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
+		if (!state)
+			return 4;
+
+		state = aa_dfa_match(policy->dfa, state, data);
+		if (!state)
+			return 5;
+		*perms = *aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+		if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* failed at perms check, don't confuse with flags match */
+	return 6;
+}
+
+
+static int path_flags(const struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	return profile->path_flags |
+		(S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt_path_str - handle path matching for mount
+ * @profile: the confining profile
+ * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
+ * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
+ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAY BE NULL OR ERRPTR)
+ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: mount flags to match
+ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @binary: whether @data is binary
+ * @devinfo: error str if (IS_ERR(@devname))
+ * @ad: apparmor audit data structure
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success else error
+ */
+static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			      const struct path *mntpath, char *buffer,
+			      const char *devname, const char *type,
+			      unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
+			      const char *devinfo,
+			      struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	const char *mntpnt = NULL;
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	int pos, error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!mntpath);
+	AA_BUG(!buffer);
+
+	if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+		return 0;
+
+	ad->mnt.type = type;
+
+	error = aa_path_name(mntpath, path_flags(profile, mntpath), buffer,
+			     &mntpnt, &ad->info, profile->disconnected);
+	if (error)
+		return aa_audit_perm_error(&profile->label, AA_MAY_MOUNT,
+					   error, ad, audit_cb);
+	ad->name = mntpnt;
+
+	if (IS_ERR(devname)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(devname);
+		ad->info = devinfo;
+		return aa_audit_perm_error(&profile->label, AA_MAY_MOUNT,
+					   error, ad, audit_cb);
+	}
+	ad->mnt.src_name = devname;
+
+	pos = do_match_mnt(rules->policy,
+			   rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, &perms);
+	if (pos)
+		ad->info = mnt_info_table[pos];
+
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	if (data && !binary && (perms.audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
+		ad->mnt.data = data;
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_MOUNT, ad, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
+ * @profile: the confining profile
+ * @path: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
+ * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
+ * @devpath: path devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @devbuffer: buffer to be used to lookup devname/src_name
+ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: mount flags to match
+ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @binary: whether @data is binary
+ * @ad: apparmor audit data structure
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success else error
+ */
+static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+		     char *buffer, const struct path *devpath, char *devbuffer,
+		     const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data,
+		     bool binary, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	const char *devname = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	int error = -EACCES;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(devpath && !devbuffer);
+
+	if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (devpath) {
+		error = aa_path_name(devpath, path_flags(profile, devpath),
+				     devbuffer, &devname, &info,
+				     profile->disconnected);
+		if (error)
+			devname = ERR_PTR(error);
+	}
+
+	return match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, devname,
+				  type, flags, data, binary, info, ad);
+}
+
+int aa_remount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+	       struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+	       unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+	bool binary;
+	int error;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_MOUNT(ad, OP_MOUNT, subj_cred);
+	ad.mnt.flags = flags;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+			match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+				  flags, data, binary, &ad));
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_bind_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+		  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
+	struct path old_path;
+	int error;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_MOUNT(ad, OP_MOUNT, subj_cred);
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
+	ad.mnt.flags = flags;
+
+	error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
+	if (error)
+		return aa_audit_perm_error(label, AA_MAY_MOUNT, error, &ad,
+			audit_cb);
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	old_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	error = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!buffer || !old_buffer)
+		goto out;
+
+	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+			match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path,
+				  old_buffer, NULL, flags, NULL, false, &ad));
+out:
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+	aa_put_buffer(old_buffer);
+	path_put(&old_path);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_mount_change_type(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+			 unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+	int error;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_MOUNT(ad, OP_MOUNT, subj_cred);
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	/* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
+	flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
+		  MS_UNBINDABLE);
+	ad.mnt.flags = flags;
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+			match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+				  flags, NULL, false, &ad));
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_move_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *from_path,
+		  const struct path *to_path)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *to_buffer = NULL, *from_buffer = NULL;
+	int error;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_MOUNT(ad, OP_MOUNT, subj_cred);
+	ad.mnt.flags = MS_MOVE;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!from_path);
+	AA_BUG(!to_path);
+
+	to_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	from_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	error = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!to_buffer || !from_buffer)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!our_mnt(from_path->mnt))
+		/* moving a mount detached from the namespace */
+		from_path = NULL;
+	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+			match_mnt(profile, to_path, to_buffer, from_path,
+				  from_buffer, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, false,
+				  &ad));
+out:
+	aa_put_buffer(to_buffer);
+	aa_put_buffer(from_buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_move_mount_old(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const struct path *path, const char *orig_name)
+{
+	struct path old_path;
+	int error;
+
+	if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	error = aa_move_mount(subj_cred, label, &old_path, path);
+	path_put(&old_path);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_new_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		 const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+		 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
+	bool binary = true;
+	int error;
+	int requires_dev = 0;
+	struct path tmp_path, *dev_path = NULL;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_MOUNT(ad, OP_MOUNT, subj_cred);
+	ad.mnt.flags = flags;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	if (type) {
+		struct file_system_type *fstype;
+
+		fstype = get_fs_type(type);
+		if (!fstype)
+			return -ENODEV;
+		binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+		requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
+		put_filesystem(fstype);
+
+		if (requires_dev) {
+			if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
+				return -ENOENT;
+
+			error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &tmp_path);
+			if (error)
+				return error;
+			dev_path = &tmp_path;
+		}
+	}
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (dev_path) {
+		dev_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+		if (!dev_buffer) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+				match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, dev_path,
+					  dev_buffer, type, flags, data,
+					  binary, &ad));
+	} else {
+		error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+				match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer,
+						   dev_name, type, flags, data,
+						   binary, NULL, &ad));
+	}
+
+out:
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+	aa_put_buffer(dev_buffer);
+	if (dev_path)
+		path_put(dev_path);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+			  char *buffer, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	const char *name = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!path);
+
+	if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* TODO: lift path_name, need to separate profile path_flags from
+	 * the lookup
+	 */
+	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), buffer, &name,
+			     &ad->info, profile->disconnected);
+	if (error)
+		return aa_audit_perm_error(&profile->label, AA_MAY_UMOUNT,
+					   error, ad, audit_cb);
+
+	ad->name = name;
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa,
+			     rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+			     name);
+	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, ad, audit_cb);
+}
+
+int aa_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	      struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+	int error;
+	struct path path = { .mnt = mnt, .dentry = mnt->mnt_root };
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_MOUNT(ad, OP_UMOUNT, subj_cred);
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!mnt);
+
+	buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+			profile_umount(profile, &path, buffer, &ad));
+	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* helper fn for transition on pivotroot
+ *
+ * Returns: label for transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL
+ */
+static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					const struct path *new_path,
+					char *new_buffer,
+					const struct path *old_path,
+					char *old_buffer,
+					struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL;
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	aa_state_t state;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!new_path);
+	AA_BUG(!old_path);
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
+	    !RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+		return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
+
+	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
+			     old_buffer, &old_name, &ad->info,
+			     profile->disconnected);
+	if (error)
+		goto err;
+	ad->mnt.src_name = old_name;
+	error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
+			     new_buffer, &new_name, &ad->info,
+			     profile->disconnected);
+	if (error)
+		goto err;
+	ad->name = new_name;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa,
+			     rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+			     new_name);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->policy->dfa, state);
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, old_name);
+	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+	/* todo: allow pivotroot to specify a transition other than profile */
+	ad->mnt.trans = profile->label.hname;
+
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	error = aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, ad, audit_cb);
+
+out:
+	if (error)
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+
+	return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
+
+err:
+	error = aa_audit_perm_error(&profile->label, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, error,
+				    ad, audit_cb);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		 const struct path *old_path,
+		 const struct path *new_path)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_label *target = NULL;
+	char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
+	int error;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_MOUNT(ad, OP_PIVOTROOT, subj_cred);
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!old_path);
+	AA_BUG(!new_path);
+
+	old_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	new_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
+	error = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!old_buffer || !new_buffer)
+		goto out;
+	target = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
+			build_pivotroot(profile, new_path, new_buffer,
+					old_path, old_buffer, &ad));
+	AA_BUG(!target);
+	if (!IS_ERR(target)) {
+		error = aa_replace_current_label(target);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+		aa_put_label(target);
+	} else
+		/* already audited error in build_pivotroot */
+		error = PTR_ERR(target);
+out:
+	aa_put_buffer(old_buffer);
+	aa_put_buffer(new_buffer);
+
+	return error;
+
+fail:
+	/* TODO: add back in auditing of new_name and old_name,
+	 * needs lifting of name lookup out of profile cb
+	 */
+	ad.mnt.trans = target->hname;
+	error = aa_audit_perm_error(label, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, error, &ad,
+				    audit_cb);
+	aa_put_label(target);
+	goto out;
+}