scftorture: Count single_rpc offline failures in statistics outputgrafted

scf_torture_stats_print() aggregates each invoker thread's counters
into a local scf_statistics structure before printing, but the
n_single_rpc_ofl field is missing from the aggregation loop.  As a
result, the "single_rpc_ofl" value printed in the statistics line is
always zero, even when smp_call_function_single() invocations for the
RPC test have failed due to offline CPUs and been counted by the
invoker threads.

Add the missing accumulation so that the printed value reflects the
actual counts.

Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes <joelagnelf@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 116 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..df5712cea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/sig_names.h"
+
+
+static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
+{
+	if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
+		return SIGUNKNOWN;
+	else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
+		return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
+	else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
+		return sig_map[sig];
+	return SIGUNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_signal_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to static string
+ */
+static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+	if (mask & MAY_READ)
+		return "receive";
+	if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+		return "send";
+	return "";
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_signal_cb() - call back for signal specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+
+	if (ad->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
+				 audit_signal_mask(ad->request));
+		if (ad->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
+					 audit_signal_mask(ad->denied));
+		}
+	}
+	if (ad->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
+				 ad->unmappedsig);
+	else if (ad->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[ad->signal]);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
+				 ad->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
+			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+static int profile_signal_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct aa_profile *profile,
+			       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms perms;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+		return 0;
+
+	ad->subj_cred = cred;
+	ad->peer = peer;
+	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL);
+	if (!state)
+		return 0;
+	state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, ad->signal);
+	aa_label_match(profile, rules, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_signal_cb);
+}
+
+int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender,
+		  const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target,
+		  int sig)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL);
+
+	ad.signal = map_signal_num(sig);
+	ad.unmappedsig = sig;
+	return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
+			     profile_signal_perm(subj_cred, profile, target,
+						 MAY_WRITE, &ad),
+			     profile_signal_perm(target_cred, profile, sender,
+						 MAY_READ, &ad));
+}