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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /security/apparmor/crypto.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/crypto.c')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/crypto.c61
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/crypto.c b/security/apparmor/crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d8a7bde94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy loading interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2013 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * Fns to provide a checksum of policy that has been loaded this can be
+ * compared to userspace policy compiles to check loaded policy is what
+ * it should be.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/crypto.h"
+
+unsigned int aa_hash_size(void)
+{
+ return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+}
+
+char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ char *hash;
+
+ hash = kzalloc(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hash)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ sha256(data, len, hash);
+ return hash;
+}
+
+int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ struct sha256_ctx sctx;
+ __le32 le32_version = cpu_to_le32(version);
+
+ if (!aa_g_hash_policy)
+ return 0;
+
+ profile->hash = kzalloc(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!profile->hash)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ sha256_init(&sctx);
+ sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&le32_version, 4);
+ sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)start, len);
+ sha256_final(&sctx, profile->hash);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __init init_profile_hash(void)
+{
+ if (apparmor_initialized)
+ aa_info_message("AppArmor sha256 policy hashing enabled");
+ return 0;
+}