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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /security/apparmor/audit.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/audit.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/audit.c | 325 |
1 files changed, 325 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5752bb93a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor auditing functions + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + */ + +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/socket.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/policy_ns.h" +#include "include/secid.h" + +const char *const audit_mode_names[] = { + "normal", + "quiet_denied", + "quiet.allowed", + "quiet", + "noquiet", + "all" +}; + +static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = { + "AUDIT", + "ALLOWED", + "DENIED", + "HINT", + "STATUS", + "ERROR", + "KILLED", + "AUTO" +}; + +static const char *const aa_class_names[] = { + "none", + "unknown", + "file", + "cap", + "net", + "rlimits", + "domain", + "mount", + "unknown", + "ptrace", + "signal", + "xmatch", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "net", + "netv9", + "label", + "posix_mqueue", + "io_uring", + "module", + "lsm", + "namespace", + "io_uring", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "netv9_packet", + "X", + "dbus", +}; + + +/* + * Currently AppArmor auditing is fed straight into the audit framework. + * + * TODO: + * netlink interface for complain mode + * user auditing, - send user auditing to netlink interface + * system control of whether user audit messages go to system log + */ + +/** + * audit_pre() - core AppArmor function. + * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL) + * + * Record common AppArmor audit data from @va + */ +static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va); + + if (aa_g_audit_header) { + audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=\"%s\"", + aa_audit_type[ad->type]); + } + + if (ad->op) + audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", ad->op); + + if (ad->class) + audit_log_format(ab, " class=\"%s\"", + ad->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ? + aa_class_names[ad->class] : + "unknown"); + + if (ad->info) { + audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", ad->info); + if (ad->error) + audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", ad->error); + } + + if (ad->subj_label) { + struct aa_label *label = ad->subj_label; + + if (label_isprofile(label)) { + struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label); + + if (profile->ns != root_ns) { + audit_log_format(ab, " namespace="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, + profile->ns->base.hname); + } + audit_log_format(ab, " profile="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname); + } else { + audit_log_format(ab, " label="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, root_ns, label, FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, + GFP_ATOMIC); + } + } + + if (ad->name) { + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name); + } +} + +int aa_select_audit_type(u32 denied, const struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + if (likely(!denied)) + return AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; + else if (denied & perms->kill) + return AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; + else if (denied == (denied & perms->complain)) + return AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED; + return AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED; +} + +/** + * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem + * @type: audit type for the message + * @ad: audit event structure (NOT NULL) + * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) + */ +void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, + void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) +{ + ad->type = type; + common_lsm_audit(&ad->common, audit_pre, cb); +} + +int aa_audit_perm_error(struct aa_label *label, u32 request, int error, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, + void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)) +{ + int type = aa_select_audit_type(request, &nullperms); + + if (ad) { + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct label_it i; + + ad->request = request; + ad->denied = request; + ad->error = error; + label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) { + ad->subj_label = &profile->label; + aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb); + } + } + + return error; +} + +/** + * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem + * @type: audit type for the message + * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL) + * @ad: audit event (NOT NULL) + * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags + * + * Returns: error on failure + */ +int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, + void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) +{ + AA_BUG(!profile); + + if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) { + if (likely(!ad->error)) { + if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) + return 0; + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; + } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED; + else + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED; + } + if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET || + (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED)) + return ad->error; + + if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED) + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; + + ad->subj_label = &profile->label; + + aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb); + + if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) + send_sig_info(profile->signal, SEND_SIG_NOINFO, + ad->common.type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && + ad->common.u.tsk ? ad->common.u.tsk : current); + + if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) + return complain_error(ad->error); + + return ad->error; +} + +struct aa_audit_rule { + struct aa_label *label; +}; + +void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) +{ + struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule; + + if (rule) { + if (!IS_ERR(rule->label)) + aa_put_label(rule->label); + kfree(rule); + } +} + +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct aa_audit_rule *rule; + + switch (field) { + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal) + return -EINVAL; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + rule = kzalloc_obj(struct aa_audit_rule, gfp); + + if (!rule) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ + rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, + gfp, true, false); + if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { + int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); + aa_audit_rule_free(rule); + return err; + } + + *vrule = rule; + return 0; +} + +int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; + + switch (f->type) { + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule) +{ + struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule; + struct aa_label *label; + int found = 0; + + label = prop->apparmor.label; + + if (!label) + return -ENOENT; + + if (aa_label_is_subset(label, rule->label)) + found = 1; + + switch (field) { + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + switch (op) { + case Audit_equal: + return found; + case Audit_not_equal: + return !found; + } + } + return 0; +} |
