diff options
| author | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 09:55:01 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 11:08:21 -0400 |
| commit | 4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 (patch) | |
| tree | 350aa83b47da0b574a814795392b20b0bed83cbc /security/apparmor/audit.c | |
| download | linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.tar.gz linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.zip | |
ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_opsgrafted
There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since
it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls
ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that
if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to
have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other
call.
Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the
ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that
states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex
has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut
having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after
the mute is taken in case of races.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/audit.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/audit.c | 325 |
1 files changed, 325 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5752bb93a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor auditing functions + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + */ + +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/socket.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/policy_ns.h" +#include "include/secid.h" + +const char *const audit_mode_names[] = { + "normal", + "quiet_denied", + "quiet.allowed", + "quiet", + "noquiet", + "all" +}; + +static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = { + "AUDIT", + "ALLOWED", + "DENIED", + "HINT", + "STATUS", + "ERROR", + "KILLED", + "AUTO" +}; + +static const char *const aa_class_names[] = { + "none", + "unknown", + "file", + "cap", + "net", + "rlimits", + "domain", + "mount", + "unknown", + "ptrace", + "signal", + "xmatch", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "net", + "netv9", + "label", + "posix_mqueue", + "io_uring", + "module", + "lsm", + "namespace", + "io_uring", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "netv9_packet", + "X", + "dbus", +}; + + +/* + * Currently AppArmor auditing is fed straight into the audit framework. + * + * TODO: + * netlink interface for complain mode + * user auditing, - send user auditing to netlink interface + * system control of whether user audit messages go to system log + */ + +/** + * audit_pre() - core AppArmor function. + * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL) + * + * Record common AppArmor audit data from @va + */ +static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va); + + if (aa_g_audit_header) { + audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=\"%s\"", + aa_audit_type[ad->type]); + } + + if (ad->op) + audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", ad->op); + + if (ad->class) + audit_log_format(ab, " class=\"%s\"", + ad->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ? + aa_class_names[ad->class] : + "unknown"); + + if (ad->info) { + audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", ad->info); + if (ad->error) + audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", ad->error); + } + + if (ad->subj_label) { + struct aa_label *label = ad->subj_label; + + if (label_isprofile(label)) { + struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label); + + if (profile->ns != root_ns) { + audit_log_format(ab, " namespace="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, + profile->ns->base.hname); + } + audit_log_format(ab, " profile="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname); + } else { + audit_log_format(ab, " label="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, root_ns, label, FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, + GFP_ATOMIC); + } + } + + if (ad->name) { + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name); + } +} + +int aa_select_audit_type(u32 denied, const struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + if (likely(!denied)) + return AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; + else if (denied & perms->kill) + return AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; + else if (denied == (denied & perms->complain)) + return AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED; + return AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED; +} + +/** + * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem + * @type: audit type for the message + * @ad: audit event structure (NOT NULL) + * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) + */ +void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, + void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) +{ + ad->type = type; + common_lsm_audit(&ad->common, audit_pre, cb); +} + +int aa_audit_perm_error(struct aa_label *label, u32 request, int error, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, + void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)) +{ + int type = aa_select_audit_type(request, &nullperms); + + if (ad) { + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct label_it i; + + ad->request = request; + ad->denied = request; + ad->error = error; + label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) { + ad->subj_label = &profile->label; + aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb); + } + } + + return error; +} + +/** + * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem + * @type: audit type for the message + * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL) + * @ad: audit event (NOT NULL) + * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags + * + * Returns: error on failure + */ +int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, + void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) +{ + AA_BUG(!profile); + + if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) { + if (likely(!ad->error)) { + if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) + return 0; + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; + } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED; + else + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED; + } + if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET || + (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED)) + return ad->error; + + if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED) + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; + + ad->subj_label = &profile->label; + + aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb); + + if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) + send_sig_info(profile->signal, SEND_SIG_NOINFO, + ad->common.type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && + ad->common.u.tsk ? ad->common.u.tsk : current); + + if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) + return complain_error(ad->error); + + return ad->error; +} + +struct aa_audit_rule { + struct aa_label *label; +}; + +void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) +{ + struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule; + + if (rule) { + if (!IS_ERR(rule->label)) + aa_put_label(rule->label); + kfree(rule); + } +} + +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct aa_audit_rule *rule; + + switch (field) { + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal) + return -EINVAL; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + rule = kzalloc_obj(struct aa_audit_rule, gfp); + + if (!rule) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ + rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, + gfp, true, false); + if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { + int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); + aa_audit_rule_free(rule); + return err; + } + + *vrule = rule; + return 0; +} + +int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; + + switch (f->type) { + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule) +{ + struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule; + struct aa_label *label; + int found = 0; + + label = prop->apparmor.label; + + if (!label) + return -ENOENT; + + if (aa_label_is_subset(label, rule->label)) + found = 1; + + switch (field) { + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + switch (op) { + case Audit_equal: + return found; + case Audit_not_equal: + return !found; + } + } + return 0; +} |
