diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /security/Makefile | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/Makefile')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Makefile | 31 |
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4601230ba --- /dev/null +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Makefile for the kernel security code +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/ + +# always enable default capabilities +obj-y += commoncap.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += lsm_syscalls.o +obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o + +# Object file lists +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o lsm_notifier.o lsm_init.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/ +obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_SECURITY_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ +obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o +obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe/ + +# Object integrity file lists +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/ |