staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/scripts/xen-hypercalls.sh b/scripts/xen-hypercalls.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..f18b00843
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/xen-hypercalls.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+out="$1"
+shift
+in="$@"
+
+for i in $in; do
+	eval $CPP $LINUXINCLUDE -dD -imacros "$i" -x c /dev/null
+done | \
+awk '$1 == "#define" && $2 ~ /__HYPERVISOR_[a-z][a-z_0-9]*/ { v[$3] = $2 }
+	END {   print "/* auto-generated by scripts/xen-hypercall.sh */"
+		for (i in v) if (!(v[i] in v))
+			print "HYPERCALL("substr(v[i], 14)")"}' | sort -u >$out