diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /scripts/relocs_check.sh | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/relocs_check.sh')
| -rwxr-xr-x | scripts/relocs_check.sh | 20 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/relocs_check.sh b/scripts/relocs_check.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000..137c66049 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/relocs_check.sh @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +# Get a list of all the relocations, remove from it the relocations +# that are known to be legitimate and return this list to arch specific +# script that will look for suspicious relocations. + +objdump="$1" +nm="$2" +vmlinux="$3" + +# Remove from the possible bad relocations those that match an undefined +# weak symbol which will result in an absolute relocation to 0. +# Weak unresolved symbols are of that form in nm output: +# " w _binary__btf_vmlinux_bin_end" +undef_weak_symbols=$($nm "$vmlinux" | awk '$1 ~ /w/ { print $2 }') + +$objdump -R "$vmlinux" | + grep -E '\<R_' | + ([ "$undef_weak_symbols" ] && grep -F -w -v "$undef_weak_symbols" || cat) |
