staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 27 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/scripts/mkcompile_h b/scripts/mkcompile_h
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..2596f78e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/mkcompile_h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+UTS_MACHINE=$1
+CC_VERSION="$2"
+LD=$3
+
+if test -z "$KBUILD_BUILD_USER"; then
+	LINUX_COMPILE_BY=$(whoami | sed 's/\\/\\\\/')
+else
+	LINUX_COMPILE_BY=$KBUILD_BUILD_USER
+fi
+if test -z "$KBUILD_BUILD_HOST"; then
+	LINUX_COMPILE_HOST=`uname -n`
+else
+	LINUX_COMPILE_HOST=$KBUILD_BUILD_HOST
+fi
+
+LD_VERSION=$(LC_ALL=C $LD -v | head -n1 |
+		sed -e 's/(compatible with [^)]*)//' -e 's/[[:space:]]*$//')
+
+cat <<EOF
+#define UTS_MACHINE		"${UTS_MACHINE}"
+#define LINUX_COMPILE_BY	"${LINUX_COMPILE_BY}"
+#define LINUX_COMPILE_HOST	"${LINUX_COMPILE_HOST}"
+#define LINUX_COMPILER		"${CC_VERSION}, ${LD_VERSION}"
+EOF