usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmdgrafted

generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of
ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]:

    u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F);  /* 0 .. 15 */
    ...
    con->data[cmd] = value;            /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */

struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as
a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44
bytes past the end of the array on the heap.

A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR
request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds
access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions.

Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions.

Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <liuwb@xiaopeng.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>
Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 20 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/mnconf-common.h b/scripts/kconfig/mnconf-common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..53bd7292e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/kconfig/mnconf-common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef MNCONF_COMMON_H
+#define MNCONF_COMMON_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include <list_types.h>
+
+struct search_data {
+	struct list_head *head;
+	struct menu *target;
+};
+
+extern int jump_key_char;
+
+int next_jump_key(int key);
+int handle_search_keys(int key, size_t start, size_t end, void *_data);
+int get_jump_key_char(void);
+
+#endif /* MNCONF_COMMON_H */