staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 31 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/icons/load.xpm b/scripts/kconfig/icons/load.xpm
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8c2d8725d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/kconfig/icons/load.xpm
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/* XPM */
+static char * load_xpm[] = {
+"22 22 5 1",
+". c None",
+"# c #000000",
+"c c #838100",
+"a c #ffff00",
+"b c #ffffff",
+"......................",
+"......................",
+"......................",
+"............####....#.",
+"...........#....##.##.",
+"..................###.",
+".................####.",
+".####...........#####.",
+"#abab##########.......",
+"#babababababab#.......",
+"#ababababababa#.......",
+"#babababababab#.......",
+"#ababab###############",
+"#babab##cccccccccccc##",
+"#abab##cccccccccccc##.",
+"#bab##cccccccccccc##..",
+"#ab##cccccccccccc##...",
+"#b##cccccccccccc##....",
+"###cccccccccccc##.....",
+"##cccccccccccc##......",
+"###############.......",
+"......................"
+};