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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /scripts/extract-module-sig.pl | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/extract-module-sig.pl')
| -rwxr-xr-x | scripts/extract-module-sig.pl | 138 |
1 files changed, 138 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/extract-module-sig.pl b/scripts/extract-module-sig.pl new file mode 100755 index 000000000..36a2f59c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/extract-module-sig.pl @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# extract-mod-sig <part> <module-file> +# +# Reads the module file and writes out some or all of the signature +# section to stdout. Part is the bit to be written and is one of: +# +# -0: The unsigned module, no signature data at all +# -a: All of the signature data, including magic number +# -d: Just the descriptor values as a sequence of numbers +# -n: Just the signer's name +# -k: Just the key ID +# -s: Just the crypto signature or PKCS#7 message +# +use warnings; +use strict; + +die "Format: $0 -[0adnks] module-file >out\n" + if ($#ARGV != 1); + +my $part = $ARGV[0]; +my $modfile = $ARGV[1]; + +my $magic_number = "~Module signature appended~\n"; + +# +# Read the module contents +# +open FD, "<$modfile" || die $modfile; +binmode(FD); +my @st = stat(FD); +die "$modfile" unless (@st); +my $buf = ""; +my $len = sysread(FD, $buf, $st[7]); +die "$modfile" unless (defined($len)); +die "Short read on $modfile\n" unless ($len == $st[7]); +close(FD) || die $modfile; + +print STDERR "Read ", $len, " bytes from module file\n"; + +die "The file is too short to have a sig magic number and descriptor\n" + if ($len < 12 + length($magic_number)); + +# +# Check for the magic number and extract the information block +# +my $p = $len - length($magic_number); +my $raw_magic = substr($buf, $p); + +die "Magic number not found at $len\n" + if ($raw_magic ne $magic_number); +print STDERR "Found magic number at $len\n"; + +$p -= 12; +my $raw_info = substr($buf, $p, 12); + +my @info = unpack("CCCCCxxxN", $raw_info); +my ($algo, $hash, $id_type, $name_len, $kid_len, $sig_len) = @info; + +if ($id_type == 0) { + print STDERR "Found PGP key identifier\n"; +} elsif ($id_type == 1) { + print STDERR "Found X.509 cert identifier\n"; +} elsif ($id_type == 2) { + print STDERR "Found PKCS#7/CMS encapsulation\n"; +} else { + print STDERR "Found unsupported identifier type $id_type\n"; +} + +# +# Extract the three pieces of info data +# +die "Insufficient name+kid+sig data in file\n" + unless ($p >= $name_len + $kid_len + $sig_len); + +$p -= $sig_len; +my $raw_sig = substr($buf, $p, $sig_len); +$p -= $kid_len; +my $raw_kid = substr($buf, $p, $kid_len); +$p -= $name_len; +my $raw_name = substr($buf, $p, $name_len); + +my $module_len = $p; + +if ($sig_len > 0) { + print STDERR "Found $sig_len bytes of signature ["; + my $n = $sig_len > 16 ? 16 : $sig_len; + foreach my $i (unpack("C" x $n, substr($raw_sig, 0, $n))) { + printf STDERR "%02x", $i; + } + print STDERR "]\n"; +} + +if ($kid_len > 0) { + print STDERR "Found $kid_len bytes of key identifier ["; + my $n = $kid_len > 16 ? 16 : $kid_len; + foreach my $i (unpack("C" x $n, substr($raw_kid, 0, $n))) { + printf STDERR "%02x", $i; + } + print STDERR "]\n"; +} + +if ($name_len > 0) { + print STDERR "Found $name_len bytes of signer's name [$raw_name]\n"; +} + +# +# Produce the requested output +# +if ($part eq "-0") { + # The unsigned module, no signature data at all + binmode(STDOUT); + print substr($buf, 0, $module_len); +} elsif ($part eq "-a") { + # All of the signature data, including magic number + binmode(STDOUT); + print substr($buf, $module_len); +} elsif ($part eq "-d") { + # Just the descriptor values as a sequence of numbers + print join(" ", @info), "\n"; +} elsif ($part eq "-n") { + # Just the signer's name + print STDERR "No signer's name for PKCS#7 message type sig\n" + if ($id_type == 2); + binmode(STDOUT); + print $raw_name; +} elsif ($part eq "-k") { + # Just the key identifier + print STDERR "No key ID for PKCS#7 message type sig\n" + if ($id_type == 2); + binmode(STDOUT); + print $raw_kid; +} elsif ($part eq "-s") { + # Just the crypto signature or PKCS#7 message + binmode(STDOUT); + print $raw_sig; +} |
