diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /scripts/extract-ikconfig | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/extract-ikconfig')
| -rwxr-xr-x | scripts/extract-ikconfig | 69 |
1 files changed, 69 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/extract-ikconfig b/scripts/extract-ikconfig new file mode 100755 index 000000000..8df33e7d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/extract-ikconfig @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# ---------------------------------------------------------------------- +# extract-ikconfig - Extract the .config file from a kernel image +# +# This will only work when the kernel was compiled with CONFIG_IKCONFIG. +# +# The obscure use of the "tr" filter is to work around older versions of +# "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern. +# +# (c) 2009,2010 Dick Streefland <dick@streefland.net> +# Licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public License. +# ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +cf1='IKCFG_ST\037\213\010' +cf2='0123456789' + +dump_config() +{ + if pos=`tr "$cf1\n$cf2" "\n$cf2=" < "$1" | grep -abo "^$cf2"` + then + pos=${pos%%:*} + tail -c+$(($pos+8)) "$1" | zcat > $tmp1 2> /dev/null + if [ $? != 1 ] + then # exit status must be 0 or 2 (trailing garbage warning) + cat $tmp1 + exit 0 + fi + fi +} + +try_decompress() +{ + for pos in `tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$img" | grep -abo "^$2"` + do + pos=${pos%%:*} + tail -c+$pos "$img" | $3 > $tmp2 2> /dev/null + dump_config $tmp2 + done +} + +# Check invocation: +me=${0##*/} +img=$1 +if [ $# -ne 1 -o ! -s "$img" ] +then + echo "Usage: $me <kernel-image>" >&2 + exit 2 +fi + +# Prepare temp files: +tmp1=/tmp/ikconfig$$.1 +tmp2=/tmp/ikconfig$$.2 +trap "rm -f $tmp1 $tmp2" 0 + +# Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects: +dump_config "$img" + +# That didn't work, so retry after decompression. +try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip +try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz +try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 +try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma +try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop -d' +try_decompress '\002\041\114\030' xyy 'lz4 -d -l' +try_decompress '\050\265\057\375' xxx unzstd + +# Bail out: +echo "$me: Cannot find kernel config." >&2 +exit 1 |
