staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 19 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/scripts/checker-valid.sh b/scripts/checker-valid.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..625a789ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/checker-valid.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#!/bin/sh -eu
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+[ ! -x "$(command -v "$1")" ] && exit 1
+
+tmp_file=$(mktemp)
+trap "rm -f $tmp_file" EXIT
+
+cat << EOF >$tmp_file
+static inline int u(const int *q)
+{
+	__typeof_unqual__(*q) v = *q;
+	return v;
+}
+EOF
+
+# sparse happily exits with 0 on error so validate
+# there is none on stderr. Use awk as grep is a pain with sh -e
+$@ $tmp_file 2>&1 | awk -v c=1 '/error/{c=0}END{print c}'