openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 19 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/scripts/checker-valid.sh b/scripts/checker-valid.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..625a789ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/checker-valid.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#!/bin/sh -eu
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+[ ! -x "$(command -v "$1")" ] && exit 1
+
+tmp_file=$(mktemp)
+trap "rm -f $tmp_file" EXIT
+
+cat << EOF >$tmp_file
+static inline int u(const int *q)
+{
+	__typeof_unqual__(*q) v = *q;
+	return v;
+}
+EOF
+
+# sparse happily exits with 0 on error so validate
+# there is none on stderr. Use awk as grep is a pain with sh -e
+$@ $tmp_file 2>&1 | awk -v c=1 '/error/{c=0}END{print c}'