usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmdgrafted

generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of
ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]:

    u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F);  /* 0 .. 15 */
    ...
    con->data[cmd] = value;            /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */

struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as
a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44
bytes past the end of the array on the heap.

A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR
request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds
access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions.

Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions.

Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <liuwb@xiaopeng.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>
Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/scripts/check-git b/scripts/check-git
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..2ca6c5df1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/check-git
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# succeed if we are in a git repository
+
+srctree="$(dirname $0)/.."
+
+if ! git -C "${srctree}" rev-parse --verify HEAD >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+if ! test -z $(git -C "${srctree}" rev-parse --show-cdup 2>/dev/null); then
+	exit 1
+fi